



مكتبة قطر الوطنية QATAR NATIONAL LIBRARY

لقد تم إنشاء هذا الملف بنسخة بي دي إف بتاريخ ٢٠١٧/١٠/٠٧ بواسطة مصادر من الإنترنت كجزء من الأرشيف الرقمي لمكتبة قطر الرقمية. يحتوي السجل على الإنترنت على معلومات إضافية وصور عالية الدقة قابلة للتقريب ومخطوطات. بالإمكان مشاهدتها على الرابط التالي:

http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100000000831.0x0003b3

المراجع	IOR/R/15/5/24
العنوان	"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد"
التاريخ/ التواريخ	٠٧ أغسطس ١٩٠٤-٢٦ أغسطس ١٩٠٩ (ميلادي)
لغة الكتابة	الإنجليزية والعربية في اللاتينية بالأحرف والعربية
الحجم والشكل	ملف واحد (١٩٣ ورقة)
المؤسسة المالكة	المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند
حق النشر	<u>الملكية العامة</u>

حول هذا السجل


يحتوي هذا الملف على مراسلات بين مسؤولين بريطانيين تتعلق بشكل أساسي بتزايد قوة ابن سعود [الذي يشار إليه على نحو شائع بابن سعود أو باسمه الكامل عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن بن فيصل آل سعود].

تتناقش هذه المراسلات علاقة الحكومة البريطانية مع ابن سعود، وخلافه مع آل رشيد، وهم حكام إمارة جبل شمر (أو إمارة حائل)، بالإضافة إلى علاقاته مع الدولة العثمانية وحاكم الكويت الشيخ مبارك الصباح.

يدور جزء كبير من المراسلات بين الوكيل السياسي في بوشهر، الرائد بيرسي زكريا كوكس، والوكيل السياسي في الكويت، النقيب ستيفارت جورج نوks. يحتوي الملف أيضاً على عدد محدود من المراسلات المباشرة بين ابن سعود ونوكس (باللغة العربية مع ترجمات بالإنجليزية) ومراسلات من وزارة الخارجية في لندن ووزارة الخارجية في الحكومة في الهند.



"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [أمامي] (٣٨٦/١)






"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [أمامي-داخلي] (٣٨٦/٢)







"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [٢و] (٣٨٦/٣)







"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [ظ٢] (٣٨٦/٤)









I have not received
detailed orders as yet.
as the orders to proceed
to Koweit were telegraphic
but I shall be glad
if you will write me




Your wishes & you
may rest assured, my
friend, that they will
be fully represented
by me to the Government
of India through the
Resident in the Persian
Gulf Government & that
the great Government
will give those wishes
their full consideration.
May you be preserved!

Sh.



"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [٥٥] (٣٨٦/١٠)





Agha Mu? Khalil^⑥ 4
reports from reliable
sources:—

that Bani Rashid (with
the help of Turkish soldiers
& guns) has defeated
Abdur Rahman bin
Faysal & that Abdul Aziz,
son of the above has been
wounded & three of his
fingers shot away.

Abdul Aziz is at Kasim
& his father at Riyadh.

They cannot hope to
fight at present but
are watching the
movements of the
Turkish troops who
intend to march against
all the Hejd districts.

As Abdul Rahman
cannot make head
against them, he will
probably abandon all the
places of which he has
taken possession & return to



Koweit. b

On the 6th instant,
Sheikh Moobarak sent
400 M. H. rifles & a lakh
of cartridges & men with
provisions & 200 camels
for Abdur Rahman who
had asked for help.



(sd) Mr. Khalil

8/8/4

Original forwarded under
cover of D.O. letter to D.R.

8/8/4

SK
↓
no copy



News up to Thursday last
the 4th instant has reached
Koweit from the interior.

The Sheikh informs me
that there has been fighting
to the ^{South} west of Aneyza &
Boreyda.

After fighting mentioned
in previous reports, Ben
Rashid took possession
of Boquaria ^{البرية} ^{بوقرية}
2 hours distance from Boreyda
& left there a garrison of
about 160 Bedouins &
proceeded to bombard
Khabra ^{خبرا} about the
same distance further
west. The bombardment
according to Sheikh Mubarek
news effected nothing
Muhammad ^{younger son of Abd}
but Ben Saood with 600
men took the opportunity
to go against the
Boquaria garrison

in Rahman in



8
whom he defeated &
dispersed. The latest
news is that ^{well to the west} Br. Rashid
is at Shammir, ^{near} ~~near~~
attacking Rus & that
Bin Saood is advancing
from Buqarria & Khaba.
The truth of the matter
appears to be that Bin
Saood cannot stand
up against the Turkish
soldiers & guns but
is quite powerful enough
to harass & cut off
outposts.

It is still thought
that Turkish soldiers
are being sent or going
to be sent from Medina
about 6 days journey
from Hejd (according to
Sh. Mobarak) to join
Br. Rashid's forces.

Abdur Rahman has

شمانية



٨٩
written to Sh. Mobarak
that, if troops come from
Medina, he will not
be able to resist but
that, if the Turkish
troops are withdrawn,
there will be no further
disturbances between
him & Bin Rashid.
He mentions the Resident's
letter & says that he
has had no reply to his
representations to the British
Government.


11/7/4 Sh.

Forwarded to O. R.
under cover of D/O no: 5
dt. 11/8/4 of which no
copy kept

11/8/4. Sh.


no copy








"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [٩ظ] (٣٨٦/١٨)






الحمد لله الرحمن الرحيم


عن عبد الرحمن الفيصل السعود الى جنابه عالي الجاه وكيل الدولة الفتيحة لربطانية لئلا نلبيز قبطان ناكس

الحمد لله تعالى بعد سؤا لنا عن عزيز خاطركم وغنا بجهه الله بغير وفي ابرك الساعة صلينا مشرككم العالي
لور في شهر جماد اول عتكي و امرتم ان حضركم العاليه شرفتم لكويت ومقيمين خير مقدم استا
ما نننا نرضي لكم كلاً جاري علينا لاياس نخنا يا محب من استجينا ببركة ابن رشيد وترغيبه الالرك
المشأنا على او طاننا انا عشت بنا ربيع شهر صفر عتكي نل با ليوز خيليج فارس وعندي معلوم
محقق عندي اننا نمة حما بكم لئلا نننا جينا الغير وار قبلنا مواسلهم الان نخنا غب طرفكم عن غيركم
ووا خطين على الدولة البهيمه القيصريه دخال من الرك ونظرهم او طاننا وعلنا نيد ولا ابن رشيد
لما لم اقمهم عفتنا وابن رشيد اوصل المسكر الا طرف بلدان القيصريه وهو معهم ليد سبنا نود نغالا
ما وفهم وابعدهم وولنا عبد العزيز بن واصل في نجد عموماً قباوهم والشخص والمضارحه فخل الله
الحا ابن رشيد وعسكر الرك الان طارد بينهم عن حما لكان لكان الله دولة الرك ونخنا ما فابل
دول ولان نوصية بن رشيد مع اواده الذي يرسلهم لولنا عبد العزيز والابا بل دينا والينا
نه ماسين بمسك السلطان يفتلون رجالنا ويسئلون على النساء والبلدان لان آل سعود
ايبون يد خلون لئلا نلبيز في نجد لله وصايا به الى عامة عوم الناس الان نخنا كل يوم ننظر
مرحمتكم وحميتكم ومنع عسكر الرك عنا البظا الان نكرار حنا نصيد حظركم العاليه اننا
دا خطين دخاله على دولكم البهيمه القيصريه بانجا به على حما لكان ونخنا تكون نمة امركم كما كان
غيرنا اعمان والبحرين والكويت لعلنا لنجو بصلكم فاعل ذلك الان بلقنا البظا ان الرك مجوزين
عسكر من المد نينه فأننا اذا ما سنلوف حنم مساعده منع عسكر الرك عنا بوجه السري
النا استطلاع الحاربة دوله سنلوف لنا سنلوفه منتظرين لجواب عاجلاً من حظركم
ود مته سالمين حرماً في جماد آخر ١٣٤٣






In the name of God, the merciful, the
Compassionate.
From Abdur-Rahman - ul-Fayez - ul-Saoud
to the high placed agent of the glorious British
Government Captain Knox.
May God on high preserve him. After
asking about your friendly heart - & we
praise God & in a blessed hour your ^{page}
honoured & exalted letter reached us.
It was dated on the month of Jamadi-ul-Awal
1322 H. & you ordered that your exalted
honour had dignified Koweit & are
staying there - May your arrival be good,
if God will - and that we should
petition to you whatever has happened to us.
Well & good. We, Day friend, after
out of what I came to know about
the machinations of Ibn Rashid & his
leaning towards the Turks with his
coming against our countries, I petitioned
in the month of Safar 1322 H. to the
Consul of the Persian Gulf & it is
known to me & I fully believe that we
are under your protection because we
have shunned others & we have not
accepted ~~connections~~ relations with them.
Now we love you & no other & we are
taking refuge (دخلى) with the precious
Imperial Government - a refuge





from the Turkes & their oppression on
our countries & our provinces (Hejd).
Otherwise Ibn Rashid is of no consequence
to us. And Ibn Rashid has brought
troops against into the neighbourhood
of the cities ^{towns} of Al-Qa'im & he with
them - praised & exalted be God - has
not attained to them & we have sent
them away & our son Abdul Aziz & the
people of Hejd in a body have gone out
against them & destruction & injury
(resulted) by the grace of God on Ibn
Rashid & the Turkish soldiers & ^{we} are now
chasing them from our provinces. But
this is the Turkish Government &
we cannot face a government.
And now the warnings of Ibn Rashid
with his men whom ~~he~~ he is sending
against my son Abdul Aziz & our countries
& us ^{are} that he is marching with the
soldiers of the Sultan killing our
men & exercising authority over our
women & countries. because the
family of Saood is desirous of
bringing the English into Hejd. This
is his warning to all people. Now





13


we every day are looking for your
fity & protection & the prevention of
the Turkish soldiers from us also.


Now again we inform your high
presence that we are taking refuge
with your ^{meantime} Government with protection
over an promise & we will be under
your orders as are others Oman,
Bahrein & Koweit. These have
fled for refuge to your protection. We
hope for that; otherwise it has reached
us also that the Turks are despatching
soldiers from Medina, so that we, if
we do not see assistance from you &
the stopping quickly of the Turks from us,
we have no power to fight a government
We are looking & expecting a reply
from you quickly & may you remain
safe. 1st Jamad ulkhi 1322 H.

True translation

18/8/4

Minor Captain
T.A. Koweit





To P.A. Bushie
No. 8 D/Koweit
18/8/4.

Sir,

page 11
I have the honour to
forward herewith a
copy of the translation
of Bui Saood's reply
to my letter, a trans-
lation of which was
forwarded to you with
my letter no. 3 dated
the 7th August 1904.
page 4

2. I have consulted
Mr Alpha Muhammad
Khalil who is of the
opinion that Bui Saood's
letter does not call
for an immediate
reply.

3. Accordingly, I



15
forward herewith a
draft reply which I
shall, if it receives your
approval, forward to
Abdur Rahman bin Saood
I have
Jc
Jh



Draft letter ⑤/6
to Abdur-Rahman bin
Saud for approval of
Resident, Persian Gulf.

A.C. I have received
your friendly letter of
the 1st Jamadi-ul-Akhir
& rejoice to hear of your
wellfare. All is well with
us.


You say that you trust
that you are under the
British protection of the
British Govt. Your letter
has been forwarded by
me without delay on the
day after its arrival to
the Resident in the
Persian Gulf & without
doubt he will transmit
it to the proper quarter.
But it is well for me
to remind you, O my
friend, ^{in clear terms} that the great




Government does not
accord its protection
rashly or without much
forethought. It is not
praise be to God of those
who promise much & do
not perform.


Hitherto no reply
has been vouchsafed
by the great Government
to your petition. May
that reply be soon
received & may it be
propitious & you pleased.

In the meantime, I
shall always be pleased
to hear from you & about
your affairs & I shall
do what lies in my
power to further your
interests






14
You left; to tell him
you were now Br. August
at Kowait, I hoped he
would communicate
with you if he had any-
thing to ask or report.
There is nothing com-
municating in your letter
to him, but where the
name of God is mentioned
these sort of people are
apt to imagine more
than is meant





Until we know God's
views if you have to
write to him, it is better
to leave out all
mention of God if not
absolutely necessary.
Keep on friendly terms
personally s. that
if there is subsequently
anything to say from
God, but don't go
beyond that.
It is possible some





"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٨و] (٣٨٦/٣٥)








Cpl D/O. no 13 ¹⁵ 22
Df. Koweit
22/8/4.

My dear Major,
Just a line to tell
you that, in case there
may be any misunder-
standing of the meaning
of Abdur-Rahman bin
Saud's reply to my
letter forwarded to you
with my no 8 of August 18th
I approached the subject
cautiously & tentatively
with Sheikh Moobarak
2. The latter tells me
that he is quite sure
Abdur Rahman understands
the situation perfectly &
is quite aware that he
is not under British
protection. The expressions
which he employs in his



letter are a mere façon
de parler & more simply
simply his sincere desire
to come under our flag.

3. In these circumstances you
may think it necessary
to alter materially the
tone of my draft reply.
I was misled myself.

In haste to catch the
post


Yours sincerely
J. K. R.

Report.

16
24 (20)


I have questioned very closely an old Bedouin who has come from the parts where fighting is going on. He seems more intelligent than the majority. He is named "Mithaay" bin "Kodba" - "Raslidi." - He has come straight from Abdul Aziz bin Saud in "Rass" which he left exactly seven days ago.

He has some idea of making a rough drawing in sand & from him I have elicited that rough sketch which accompanies this report. - The position briefly is this. 700 Turkish Soldiers, not all fully armed, with one working gun are shut up in the deserted village of Shanaynah which has no houses nor cultivation only a few wells. Mithaay reports that half the Turkish Soldiers have died or been killed & that the one gun is all that remains serviceable of



25
the 5 Jums - they started with. The Soldiers
have food with them and Bin Rashid's -
men draw their Supplies from the village
of "Nabhania" two hours from Bin Rashid's
encampment. Bin Rashid with some
Hail citizens extends away to the South
of the fortification. His Bedouins lie
in the rear of Bin Rashid's front line.

The army of Abdul Aziz bin Saud lies all
along the eastern line of the Sketch closing
the road to Anegza's "Baledda". It is said
to be 10500 infantry strong with 1800 horse.
The road to the north Hail is closed by
the Beni Aghail 500 foot. The road lies
open on the south & west. On the South
the caravan road to Mecca & on the
west the Beni Hail. In both these
directions retreat is unlikely & would
be extremely dangerous. —



From T. A. Koweit ²¹ 17
2/6
To T. R. Bashine
No 14 Df. Koweit
26/8/4.


Sir,

I have the honour to
forward herewith the latest
information I have received
of the fighting at Heyd
between the factions of Beni
Saoud & Beni Rashid

I have

2. It will probably be found
advisable to divide the
numbers given for Beni Saoud's
forces by 10 to arrive at a
just appreciation of his
fighting strength but I think
there is no doubt that Sheikh
Mubarak believes in the
truth of these latest
reports.

3. As a proof of this, I
may mention that last



night, he said that he
was quite willing to 21
send me to Hejd if I
wished to go & to hold
himself absolutely
responsible for my safety.
I venture to think that
he would not say this
unless he was sure that
^{Saoud} this party was in the ascendant.
4 I made the suggestion
merely as a test of his
belief in the correctness
of the Hejd reports. He said
that I could, travelling
rapidly go & return within
14 days.

I have &c

R

Confidential

(2) 18
28

To P. R.

No 18 of Koweit

3/9/4.

Sir,


I h. the h. to inform you that I have just returned from a long & interesting conversation with Sheikh Inbarak about affairs in Reid. The communications he made to me appear to me important & I take the opportunity of noting them down while they are still fresh in my memory.

2. ^{The Sh. has learnt} It appears that the Wali of Bussorah ^{on the 25th August} has received a telegram from the Porte in which it is said that it appears that Bin Saud's affairs are progressing, while Bin Rashid's power is weakening.


+ Bui Rashid is asking for more help. The telegram concludes by calling on the Wali of Bussorah for his opinion on the situation.

3. It further appears that the Wali of Bussorah has replied to the effect that he sees no necessity for the appointment of a mutasarrif at Hejd & volunteers to make Bui Saood, ruler of Hejd in the name of the Turks. The above information was received in a private letter from the ^{Wahabite} ^{agent of the Persian steam navigation} Agha Jafar, who is said to be ~~the~~ ^{one of} the Wali's most trusted & confidential advisers to ~~Shah~~.

4. Apparently, in pursuance of this intention, the Wali approached 1st Syud Rafab the wakil of Bussorah & 2^{ndly} Agha Jafar, mentioned above.



asking them to write ^{(23) 19} 30
 privately to Sh: Inbarak
 on behalf of the ^{the} ~~Wale~~ ^{to}
 suggesting that he should
 advise Bin Saood as
 follows: —
 "That he should write to
 the ~~Mukhtar~~ al Bagdad
 to say that Bin Rashid
 had brought soldiers into
 Hejd, that the people had
 risen against them &
 that Bin Saood, always
 a faithful servant of the
 Sultan, had taken the
 soldiers under his
 protection, that there was
 no need of Turkish
 as B.S. was ready to execute the Sultan's commands
 soldiers in Hejd & that
 they should be with drawn.
 He & that he would
 send them safely wherever
 directed".
 5. The writer of this letter
 to Sh: Inbarak was
 authorised to promise
 as a return for ^{Bin Saood's} the letter
 the establishment of



Bni Saood, as ruler of 31
 Hejd under Turkish
 protection but without
 Turkish interference in
 the shape of soldiers &
 officials. He was also to promise rewards & titles
 for both Sh. Mubarak
 & Bni Saood.
 6. The Sheikh is of the
 opinion that this proposal
 of the Wali to Bni Saood
 & ^{himself} ~~himself~~ was inspired
 from Constantinople ~~who~~
~~have~~ & that the Turkish
 authorities approve the
 Wali's policy.
 7. However, neither ~~of the~~
 Syed Rajah & Agah Jafir
 refused began to make
 excuses & declined to
 assist the Wali who was
 forced to look elsewhere
 for a man to write to
 Sheikh Mubarak. He
 selected Abdul H. Effendi,
 the Sheikh's agent, who
 said that he was ready
 to obey the Wali's orders

20 (24)
but thought it extremely unlikely 32
that Sheikh Moabarak would
take any notice of such a comm.
especially coming from a man of
no importance like himself, a
mere man of business.

The Wali was therefore again
in difficulties but, none the
less, all three persons have
written, each on his own account
& ostensibly without the knowledge
of the Wali, to Sheikh M. informing
him that the W. had approached
them with this proposal. The
letters reached the Sheikh about
the 26th Aug.

8. At this point, I remarked
that it seemed to me extremely
likely that the Wali, having failed
to induce Sh. M. to write would
communicate his offers direct
to B. S. which he could do without
difficulty. The Sh. agreed & added
that this was exactly what he feared.

9. I then said to the Sheikh that,
while it would be impossible for



33
him to make any such communication
to Bin Saood without the full
knowledge & approval of the
Br. Govt., it occurred to me
that, in certain cases, it might
be possible that Govt. might
direct him to suggest that B.S.
should make his peace with the
Turks on the condition of retaining
his independence at the price of
a merely nominal ack^{nt} of the
Sultan's suzerainty.

10. I took special care to
impress on the Sheikh that, in
all this, I spoke without the
authority of my Government &
with the very incomplete knowledge
of a newcomer & that I was merely
anxious to learn his views on a
possible solution of the Hejazi
difficulty.



11. I said that it ^{might be} ~~occurred~~ ^{argued} ~~to me~~ that the British ²¹ ~~34~~ interest in Hejd was merely subsidiary, that while I understood that the British Govt. was firmly resolved to maintain the independence of Kuwait & could not tolerate the presence of an ^{powerful} enemy ~~at~~ of its Sheikh Mubarak at its gates, it ~~was~~ might be disposed to regard with ^{comparative} indifference the fact that the ruler of Hejd owed allegiance to the Porte provided that that ruler of Hejd was friendly to Sheikh Mubarak & was in no danger of being forced or cajoled into ^{hostilities} ~~cooperation~~ against Kuwait by the Turks or anyone else.

12. It seemed unlikely that Bin Saud could without outside assistance



maintain himself in
Hej'd, that he would
never apply for Turkish help
~~courtesy~~ which would
mean his own downfall as
a matter of course in a
short time & that he
would be obliged to turn
to his old friend & ally
Irobank in every difficulty.

13. This view of the
position however did not
satisfy the Sheikh. He
said that he was afraid
that the ^{act. of} Turkish suzerainty
would only mean the
beginning of the absorption
of Hej'd & he added
expressions which seemed
to show that he ^{could} ~~was~~ not
altogether satisfied trust
Bin Laood, especially
linked with the Turks.
He repeated over & over again
that ~~Be~~^S was a Bedu, meaning
apparently that he was

on this side today, on the ²²
other tomorrow. ~~It is~~ ³⁶
14. It is no secret that, ⁽²⁶⁾
despite Sh. Inbarak's
assurances, Bin Saud has
been & continues to be
supported in the main by
the Sheikh of Kuwait. ~~Who in~~
~~his turn~~ ^{amns} small supplies of
food & ammunition proceed
to the interior almost weekly
& his munshi, Abdulla,
who ^{enjoys his complete} ~~is in the~~ ~~the Sheikh~~
~~through the Sheikh tolerates no advice~~
~~confidence~~ ^{complained the}
~~other day to my~~ ^{the Resident} interpreter
that "the Sheikh had
poured out money in the
interior like water & God
alone knew what would
be the end of it all."

15. On the other hand
Inbarak's power & prestige,
apart from British support,
depend almost entirely
on the Bedouins. He supplies
money & arms while they
furnish the men to push
his schemes & keep dangers



at a distance. An
interesting detail is that 31
Sheikh Hobrak styles
himself in his correspondence
with the Turkish authorities
"ruler of Koweit & head
of the tribes thereof"

I have

RK.

Confidential

No 965 of 1904.

British Residency & Consulate-General,
Rushire, 20th August 1904.

(27) 23
38

To

The Political Agent

Howeit.

page 14

Sir,

Referring to your letter No. 8 dated
18th instant enclosing draft of the reply
which you propose to send to Ibn Saood, I
have the honour to inform you that I have
telegraphed to Government brief purport of
his letter and urged the desirability of
giving some definite reply to this and his
previous representation of 2nd May.

(In reply)
file

Pending receipt of their reply it would
be best simply to acknowledge safe receipt
of Ibn Saood's letter and say that you have
asked me to refer again to Government.

I have



39


I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

P. 2. Cox Major

Off. Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf.






نقد
١٨٠٤

من قبطانه ناكس بولكل ايجنت من قبل الدولة القيصريّة التي تلي في الكويت
الجناب الرفيع عمدة الاصحاح المحب عبد الرحمن ابن فيصل السعد المحمّد سلمة
واقباً حرسه وحماً الباعث لخير كتاب المودع ابلغ اللام والسف
عن عن يده فاطم وبعد في ابرك ساعه وصل اليها كتابه العزيز المودع ١٠ جم
وفي حال وصوله بطل السعد ارسلنا الى ابوشهر لا مضمون يجر كالس قنسل ومن
الدولة القيصريّة دهم اقباله وبالثايد طلبنا منه اعاد تلوار مطلب جنتا لم
نارته بالسعد عند الدولة الفخيم القيصريّة كونف بالاطمستان اننا د
نسر بصول اخبار من جنابكم السار ودعتم ساعه ومح وسينه
في ٢٤ محاد ١٣٤٤

S. Koweit
Sep. 5th 1904.

John Caplain
P. a. Koweit





To Abdur Rahman bin Faysal Bin²⁵
Saud⁽²⁴⁾

5th Sept-04. 41

No. 3 v.


A.C.


I have received your friendly letter dated
1st Jamadi-ul-Sani which I forwarded on as
speedily as possible to Major Cox, Resident &
Consul General in Bushire. I asked him to be
so good as to refer again to the Government
on the subject. I shall always be pleased
to hear from you & may you be preserved.

pk



"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [٢٩ظ] (٣٨٦/٥٨)





Cpl To P.R. ²⁶ 42 ³⁰
Bushie
No 19 of Koweit
Sep. 5th 1904.

Sir,

page 38
↑

I have the honour to
ack. the receipt of your
Confidential letter no 965
dt. 30th Aug. 1904 & to inform
you that I have addressed
Bin Saood as directed.

I have

J.H.




Extract from D.O. d. Sep: 13th 1904 from
P.R. Bushire to P.A. Koweit.
" * * The G. of I. are not taking any as
regards Ibn Saud, or rather I can't
get any definite answer out of them.
You have the last correspondence
on the subject sent you on 16th Aug.
under this office no: 902. You must
be very cautious & reserved in this
regard. I will answer you officially
by next opportunity &c &c * *

True extract

16/9/4


J. R. Caplan
P.A. Koweit

File XXII
pages






"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [٣١ ظ] (٣٨٦/٦٢)




ك
"as to the Turkish soldiers to
"You need not care for them." to go
"Be careful about Benami: that
"He is a spy and your enemy." the a
أفانما يتجوز في هذا الوقت لا يكون له
يستقر كم من يد ذلك
لا يكون له. فتعدوا من ربح لا يرضون
وحيثما كان (منه)
This has been given to me as the address
of the passage: though I cannot
cannot extract the alleged meaning
from the Arabic words. It is said





"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [٣٢ ظ] (٣٨٦/٦٤)





30
Df. Koweit 47
16 Sept. 1904.

Dfo no. 31

Cpl. u.f.s. through P.R. Baseline.

Dear Mr. Kromah,

page 44
I have to thank you
for your Dfo of the 9th Sept
forwarded to me by Major
Cox. which reached me
yesterday.

2. I communicated the
Contents to Sheikh Mubarak
this morning. He said he
had heard of the matter
but that it was all untrue.
No letters of the kind had
passed between him &
Ibn Saood & therefore
none such could have
been intercepted by Ibn
Rashid.

3. Although, in unguarded
moments, he allows it to
be seen that he is helping
Ibn Saood, officially his
attitude is very correct.





He maintains that the
disturbances in Hejd
are nothing to him & that
he merely sends general
expressions of goodwill
in reply to the detailed
accounts of Hejd politics
which his friend Ibn
Saood is good enough to
send him.

4 It is, therefore, I think,
clear that his disclaimer
of the authorship of these
letters is of no value &
we can believe as much
of it as we please

Yours sincerely

St. John





35 32 50

No:224, dated Bushire, the 12th November 1903 (Confidential)

From-----Lieutenant-Colonel C.A.Kemball, C.I.E., Officiating
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To-----The Secretary to the Government of India in the
Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward, for the information
of the Government of India, copy of the marginally noted
letter which I have
No:228, dated 7th November 1903 received from the Assistant
Political Agent, Bahrain, regarding the state of affairs
in Arabia.


No:228, dated the 7th November 1903 (Confidential)


From-----J.C.Gaskin, Esq., Assistant Political Agent at
Bahrain,

To-----Lieutenant-Colonel C.A.Kemball, C.I.E.,
Officiating
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf

I have the honour to report that an influential
resident of Hafoof, named Sheikh Abdul Rahman-bin-Salman,
who, it will be remembered, in August 1895, brought to Bahrain
the letter of Mutesarrif of Al Hasa, re-asserting Turkish
pretensions & threatening that, failing the restoration of
the Al-bin-Ali boats seized by H.M.S. "Sphinx", an attack
would be made by the Kutr tribes on Bahrain from which
British subjects should be removed within seventeen days,
called on me on the 4th instant, and in the conversation he
made some important disclosures regarding the state of affairs
in Arabia & the attitude of the Arabs towards the Turks,
which I consider of sufficient interest to lay before you.


Sheikh Abdul Rahman stated that the aspect of
Arabia is changing rapidly, & a strong desire for secession
from Turkish rule is noticeable from all sides; that the
Arabs are well provided with modern arms & now feel their
strength








36 33 51
strength & no longer fear the Turks or consider them invincible, & he referred to Sheikh Isbarak & Bin Saud as cases in point. He believed that Bin Rashid will eventually lose Nejd, judging from his abortive attempts to reduce Riyadh & other places retaken by the Saud family; that when the latter are relieved of Bin Rashid they will undoubtedly attempt the recovery of Al Hasa from the Turks, in which it is expected they will succeed, provided the circumstances undergo no change. The Turks, he stated, were able to occupy Al Hasa through the co-operation of the Chiefs of Koweit & the Montifik Arabs, but the situation is now changed, & the Sheikh is unlikely to give any assistance, & it is doubtful whether the Montifik Arabs would take part in any future movements. The nomad Bedouins, according to Sheikh Abdul Rahman, are quite indifferent as regards who rules over them, as they acknowledge no settled Government & will follow anyone who will make it worth their while; & the inhabitants of Al Hasa are deeply dissatisfied with the Turks, ^{and} are ready to drive them out & are capable of keeping them at bay for four months until outside support reaches them, but fear of obtaining no permanent assistance from outside deters them from striking for their independence. He enquired whether in the event of the people of Al Hasa driving the Turks out of the district & applying subsequently to His Majesty's Government for protection, they would get it, & if that was impracticable whether some place would be given him in Katr where he & his followers could settle down under British protection.


I told Sheikh Abdul Rahman that it was not the custom of His Majesty's Government to intrigue with the subjects of an established State on friendly terms with it, & I advised him to entertain no hope of a successful issue from proceedings of the nature he refers to, & that as regards Katr, it was under Sheikh Jasim-bin-Thani & his brother. He appeared to feel very much disappointed at the discouragement













36 (H)
54

Telegram dated the 8th February 1904.

From-----Secretary of State London.

To-----Viceroy, Calcutta.

Please refer to your Foreign Secretary's letter to Colonel Kemball, No:36, dated the 6th January.

Without the previous sanction of His Majesty's Government, no steps should be taken to enter into closer relations with Nejd or send agents there.


No:38, dated Bushire the 5th February 1904

From-----Lieutenant-Colonel C.A.Kemball, C.I.B., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To--L.W.Dane Esquire, I.C.S., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Confidential letter No:38-B.A., dated the 6th January 1904, in which you enquire whether, in my opinion, it would be practicable & advisable to depute a European officer to visit the capital of the Saud family for the purpose of collecting intelligence.

2. As to the practicability of the proposal, it would, I believe, be impossible for an Englishman, undisguised, to find his way to Riyadh either from Katif or Ojair. The Turks would almost certainly, at the present time, prevent him from going through. As regards the route from Koweit, I directed my First Assistant, Captain Hunt, during his recent visit to Koweit, to ascertain confidentially from Sheikh Mubarak his views on the subject. The Sheikh informed Captain Hunt that the road was clear & that there would be no difficulty in arranging for an English officer to visit Riyadh. He would settle the matter with Abdul Rahman bin Faysal, & would send an escort & one of his sons with the





the officer to take him to Riyadh & bring him back. There was, he said, no risk & the officer would be able to travel quite openly. Captain Mint further reports that Mubarak appeared to be pleased with the idea, & said that he thought it would be a good thing for an English officer to visit Riyadh. Not long ago, the Vali of Busreh had sent two Germans to him with a letter asking him to see them through to Riyadh, but he had refused & sent them back on the ground that he could not ^{under-}take the responsibility for their safety.


3. It is, of course, natural that Sheikh Mubarak, whose sympathies with the cause of the Saud family are so well known, would welcome any step which might be construed as a sign of interest on the part of the British Government in the affairs of his friends. Notwithstanding the fact that the officer would be going to Riyadh merely for the purpose of collecting intelligence & without any political mission, it would be difficult for Sheikh Mubarak to believe that such was the case. He, as well as Ibn Saud, would I think, look upon it as an open espousal by us of the latter's cause, & for the visit is not one which could be kept a secret, this would also be the view taken by the Turks & Ibn Rashid.


I am further inclined to doubt whether, by a simple visit to Riyadh & back the officer would be able to obtain much intelligence of a useful & comprehensive nature.


The information which he would gain would certainly be somewhat one-sided. He would have, I think, to remain in the country for some time, & this perhaps would hardly be advisable.


4. While, then, fully admitting that it is desirable that the Government of India should be more conversant than it is at present with events in Nejd & Riyadh, I cannot help thinking that the deputation of an officer to visit Riyadh is not altogether desirable at the present juncture. So


far











40
(43) 5-8

to El Hasa, coupled with the gradual diminution of Turkish authority & the steady growth of foreign interference in these quarters, leads us to think that it may shortly be incumbent on us to take a more lively interest in the affairs of Central Arabia. The question was forced upon our notice by the interview which occurred at Koweit in March 1903, between the Captains of the "Infernet" & the "Boyarin" with Abdul Aziz-bin-Saud, & we recently addressed our Political Resident regarding a suggestion to depute a British officer to visit the capital of the Saud family for the purpose of acquiring intelligence. In view of Colonel Kemball's reply, we do not propose to proceed with the scheme at present. Later, however, when the political situation in Nejd has developed, & above all if the present representative of the Wahabi family, Abdul Rahman-el-Saud, succeeds in establishing & extending his ascendancy, which from the latest accounts received seems to be not improbable, we think that it may be desirable again to enter into relations with our old ally. We have noted the instructions conveyed in your Secret telegram of the 8th February 1903, and in the autumn of the present year we hope again to address His Majesty's Government regarding this question.


We have the honour to be

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servants,

(Signed) CURSON.
" KITCHENER.
" T. RALPH.
" H. F. - C. LAW.
" H. R. HILLES.
" A. T. ARUNDL.
" DENZIL IRVINGSON.

LWH



(Received on the 11th April with Political Secretary's letter, No. 13, dated 18th March 1904.)

KOWEIT.

[February 15.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 73.)

MY LORD,

Constantinople, February 8, 1904.

In my despatches Nos. 11 and 39 of the 11th and 26th ultimo respectively, I had the honour to transmit Reports by His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah as to the rupture between Sadun Pasha and the Ottoman authorities.

In the first despatch above mentioned, Mr. Crow represented the Ottoman Government as not unwilling to come to terms with Sadun, and at the date of the despatch of the inclosure in my despatch No. 39 he reported that the military measures taken against him were of no very drastic character.

From a telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad, dated the 11th January, and inclosed also in my despatch No. 11 of the 11th January, it would seem that the Ottoman authorities, while not undertaking any serious punitive action against the Mountefik partisans of Sadun with the regular troops at their disposal, had succeeded in inciting against him the powerful tribes of the Shammar and Aniza, and that a large combined force of these tribesmen was moving against Sadun.

On the 3rd February Mr. Crow informed me by telegraph that Sadun had applied to him for advice as to making terms and coming in to Bussorah. In the latter case he asked for a guarantee of safety from the British Consulate. Mr. Crow proposed to inform him that the Consulate could not interfere or help him, and to advise him to surrender at discretion and trust the Sultan's clemency. As, however, this language might, under certain eventualities, have entailed undesirable responsibility, I thought it better to instruct Mr. Crow to confine himself to advising Sadun that he could not interfere, and that his best course would probably be to make terms with the Turks.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) N. R. O'CONNOR.

No. 2.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 77. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 8, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship the translation of a telegram, dated the 7th ultimo, which I have obtained confidentially, addressed by the Amir Abul Aziz-ibn-Reshid to the Grand Vizier, repeating his request for the authorization of the Imperial Government to attack the Sheikh Mubarak, of Koweit, on the ground that he has attacked and plundered his country, and that he is the tool of the English.

I understand that no answer has so far been returned to Ibn Reshid, and I feel pretty confident that the Sultan will hesitate to encourage any action which is likely to encourage further disturbances in districts which are already very troubled.

11

60

Negotiations appear to be on foot between the Sheikh Abdul Houda and the Imam, which it is hoped may result in a satisfactory understanding. At the same time the Sultan cannot view without anxiety the existing situation of affairs. The tribes of the Hedjaz are restless, a large section of the Mountefik is, or has been recently, in open revolt, and the Mutessarif of Nejd has apparently been compelled to retire from El Hasa on account of the opposition he has created among the local sheikhs, as shown by the telegram No. 2 herewith inclosed.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

Emir of Nejd to the Grand Vizier.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

January 7, 1904.

• • • • •

WE have already explained, by means of the special emissaries charged with presenting our humble offerings to His Imperial Majesty, that we have never incited or invited the relatives or dependants of Mubarak-es-Sebah to take refuge with us. As regards the relations of these people to us, to whom [else] should they resort for protection? For, as we are the faithful subjects of His Majesty, our friends and the friends of the Caliph are the same.

Mubarak Pasha not only did not assent to our proposals and prayers for the restitution of their property and belongings to these unfortunate people, but he has dared to attack our men and slay and plunder them. This diminishes our power and injuriously affects our honour and prestige amongst the tribes. Whereas we are still in a position to punish him (Mubarak), and to arrest him and hand him over alive to the Imperial Government, but we have been compelled to defer energetic action pending the Imperial orders of the Commander of the Faithful. As for him, he has recently given proof of his relations with and subjection to the English. In fact, we have ascertained beyond doubt that he has been scheming to conclude a Treaty with them, and it is certain that cannon and munitions will be given to him by England and introduced into the country. It is right that the Government should be aware of the difficulties and troubles to which this will give rise in these parts.

Our object being to secure peace and tranquillity, to protect the pilgrim route, to prove our fidelity to His Imperial Majesty, and protect our power and prestige from diminution, while he is stirring up much trouble and sedition in these countries—and especially in Nejd and its neighbourhood—and as it is our duty to defend the land of the Kaaba of our worship from sedition and revolt, I beg your Highness to inform me, as soon as may be possible, what steps the Imperial Government decided to take in this matter.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Sheikhs and Notables of the Nejd Sandjak to the Grand Vizier.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

January 27, 1904.

THE proceedings of the Mutessarif Mohammad Talib Pasha are not only reducing the sandjak to ruin, but will bring the greatest trouble upon the State, which is even now beginning to make itself evident. As has happened in the Mountefik, so in this district also, not only the nomad tribes, but the settled rayah population also, is ready to rise and seek other abiding-places, for pillage, murder, and outrage have come to be the normal state of affairs.

42 (45)
61

Was it for this that the Imperial Government, to please Abdul Huda Effendi, handed over a faithful population, with all its lands and property, to Talib Pasha? In spite of the numerous telegrams which we have sent to the First Secretary and to other high authorities, no order has yet come to take from the Mutessarif and restore to us our plundered property. Every one is mourning the blood of his kinsmen, and no one is sure of his life or property. If this time again our complaints meet with no attention, 50,000 people, with their families, are ready to rise and seek the protection of a foreign State, in order to free ourselves from the oppressions and extortions of which we are become the victims.

(Received on 11th April with Political Secretary's letter, No. 12, dated 18th March 1904.)

KOWEIT.

[February 1.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 29. Confidential.)

Constantinople, January 20, 1904.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 11 of the 11th instant, in which I alluded to a message of loyalty to the Sultan sent by the Sheikh of Koweit after the visit of the Viceroy, I have the honour to report that I am informed that the telegram in question was addressed to the Grand Vizier, and stated that an important Indian official, having been on a pleasure trip round the Persian Gulf, in the course of which he had visited Koweit, Mubarak had accorded him the reception due to his rank; but that he remained, as before, the faithful servant of the Caliphate.

My informant, however, declared that the Turkish authorities attached little value to the Sheikh's protestations, realizing that Koweit was lost to them. In proof of which, he added that a question had more than once been raised of dismissing Mubarak and nominating some one else as Kaïmakam of Koweit; but the idea had been abandoned as futile.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) N. R. O'CONNOR.

Telegram, dated (and received) the 25th April 1904.

From—LIEUT.-COL. C. A. KEMBALL, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Maskat,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have received the following telegram from the Consul at Basrah—*Begins.* I have sent the following telegram to the British Ambassador at Constantinople. No. 18. Fighting at Nejd. Please see my despatch No. 20, dated the 11th April 1904. A battalion will be sent to Samawa on Saturday. It is reported that four battalions will be sent there shortly to help the Amir against Bin Saood and expel him from Aneyza. The Sheikh of Koweit should keep clear. He seems much compromised already.—*Ends.*

So far as I know, Koweit has done nothing of a compromising nature recently, but I will make sure, and, in any case, I will repeat to the Sheikh the advice given to him on a previous occasion. That the Turks should commence moving their troops at this hot season of the year seems unlikely.

13

62

Telegram dated 25th (received 26th) April 1904.

From—MAJOR L. S. NEWMARCH, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, Baghdad,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

It is reported that Ibn Saood has captured Riadh and driven out Ibn Rashid, who is now near a place called Samawa on the river Euphrates. Four Turkish Infantry regiments, each 600 strong, are under orders for Samawa, and 4,000 lira, 800 Martini-Henry rifles and 1,000 Snider rifles with 60,000 rounds of ammunition have been sent to Ibn Rashid by the Turks. The money, rifles and ammunition left Baghdad three days ago. It is also contemplated to send Ibn Rashid three new guns lately received from Constantinople, and three mountain guns. The Artillery men are practising at these guns daily.

Telegram No. 1372-E. A., dated the 28th April 1904.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,

To—His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

The following has been telegraphed by Colonel Kemball—*Regins.* I have received seems unlikely.—*Ends.* Major Newmarch telegraphs—*Regins.* It is reported these guns daily.—*Ends.* I would suggest that the Turks might again be warned against direct interference in affairs of Nejd or it may be necessary for His Majesty's Government to take measures in those regions in order to protect British interests.

(Received on 25th April with Political Secretary's letter, No. 15, dated 8th April 1904.)

KOWEIT

[February 24.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 66.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 24, 1904.


I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 73 of the 8th instant, relative to the condition of the country near Koweit.

I approve your advice to His Majesty's Consul at Bassorah as to the language he should hold to Sadun Pasha.

I am, &c.,

(Signed)

LANSDOWNE.



CONFIDENTIAL

(Received on 11th April with Political Secretary's letter No 12, dated the 18th March 1904.)

Enclosure to Foreign Office covering letter of 5th March 1904.

Foreign Office to Sir N. O'Connor.

February 24th 1904.

No 67.

Sir,

I have received your Excellency's despatch No 77 of February 8th, relative to a request made by the Amir of Nejd that the Turkish Government should permit him to attack Sheikh Mubarak of Kuwait.


I observe that you do not apprehend that the Turkish Government will give any encouragement to the Amir, and the information obtained by your Excellency is perhaps not of a character which would justify a special representation.

At the same time your Excellency will recollect that a distinct understanding was arrived at in October 1901, during a time of serious inter-tribal disturbances in the interior of Arabia that if His Majesty's Government used their influence to discourage Sheikh Mubarak from aggressive measures, the Turkish Government would on their side endeavour to restrain the Amir of Nejd.

It would seem advisable therefore that you should take a suitable opportunity of reminding the Turkish Government of this understanding, and should intimate that as His Majesty's Government have recently again repeated a warning to the Sheikh of Kuwait against participating in any insurrectionary movement they have a right to expect that the Turkish Government will use their best endeavours to restrain the Amir of Nejd from embarking on a course of action which might endanger the peace in these regions.

I am etc,

(sd) Omitted.



44 (٤٧)
64

(Received on the 30th May with Political Secretary's letter No. 20, dated the 13th May 1904.)

KOWEIT.
CONFIDENTIAL.

[April 18.]
SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received 18th April.)

(No. 262.)

CONSTANTINOPLE;
April 13th, 1904.

MY LORD,

With reference to my despatch No. 11 of the 11th January, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, reporting that Abdul Aziz-bin-Saoud had again commenced operations against the Amir of Nejd.

This action, if taken, as is probable, with the connivance of the Sheikh of Koweit, is of a piece with the reports of the latter's intrigues, to which I have called attention on several occasions.

I am afraid we shall find the Ottoman Government very unwilling to make any concession in regard to Bubian Island so long as they are imbued with the idea that Sheikh Mubarek is abetting Bin Saoud in his depredations upon the territory of Ibn-bin-Reshid, of Nejd.

I have, &c.

(Sd.) N. R. O'CONNOR.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 17.)

BUSSORAH,
March 15th, 1904.

SIR,

Letters have been received from Koweit stating that Abdul Aziz-bin-Saoud attacked Bin Jerad, a relative of the Amir, Ibn Reshed, on the 20th Zilhade, 1321 (20th January, 1904). It is affirmed that Bin Jerad was killed, with 400 of his followers, and that his flag was sent to Koweit, and that Abdul Aziz, on his return, met 150 camels, with 1,000 reals, and captured them. It is also announced that Abdul Aziz now proposes to attack Nassim and Bonyda, in the Amiri territory.

If this is correct, the Wahabee party at Riad will be considerably strengthened; but it is possible that the success of the operations may have been purposely exaggerated by the Sheikh of Koweit, who supports Abdul Aziz-bin-Saoud in his campaign against the Amir.

I have, &c.

(Sd.) F. E. CROW.

1



65
KOWEIT.
CONFIDENTIAL.

[April 21.]
SECTION 1.

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 21.)

The Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 19th April, relative to a reported defeat of Husein Jerad, relative of Ibn Rashid, by Abdul Aziz-el-Saud.

India Office, April 20, 1904.


Telegram, dated Basrah, the 1st June 1904.

From—J. H. MONAHAN, Esq., Officiating Consul at Basrah,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

About 4,000 Turkish troops, with perhaps twelve guns, are, according to information from good sources, at or near Samawa, the Amir being within a few hours of that town.

According to a confidential report which is vague and requires confirmation, the troops left that town on the 30th May 1904, presumably for Nejd.



(Received on 23rd May with Political Secretary's letter No. 19, dated 6th May 1904.)

Enclosure in Foreign Office covering letter of 30th April 1904.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 29, 10 p. m. (No. 77.)

(Telegraphic.)

Pera, April 29, 1904, 8-40 p. m.

Following from Consul at Basrah, April 27, No. 20, Telegraphic.

Private letter from Bagdad to the Sheikh of Koweit says that Turks are hastily preparing to help Amir with troops, arms, and ammunition and money, and will proceed from Samana to Aneyza early in May. Sheikh is advised to fill up wells on road and send men and provisions quickly to Soud. Bushire informed.

There is, I think, no doubt that Sheikh of Koweit is encouraging Saoud, but it is difficult for His Majesty's Consul at Basrah to give positive proof in reply to request made by His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire.

INDIA OFFICE ;

5th May 1904.

SIR,

With reference to your letter of the 30th ultimo, forwarding copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople of the 29th April, No. 77, as to the fighting in Nejd between Ibn Soud and Ibn Rashid, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to invite the attention of the Marquess of Lansdowne to the telegram from the Viceroy on the subject, dated the 28th April 1904.

As regards the encouragement being given to Ibn Soud by the Sheikh of Koweit, to which Sir N. O'Connor refers, it will be observed that the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf has reported that he will repeat to the Sheikh of Koweit the advice not to involve himself with the tribes in the interior given him on previous occasions. The last communication to the Sheikh on the subject was reported in the Viceroy's telegram of the 11th February 1904 as having been made on the 8th January.

As regards the alleged support of Ibn Rashid by the Turkish authorities to which the Viceroy draws attention, Mr. Brodrick would suggest that it may probably be sufficient to address the Turkish Government again in accordance with the terms of Lord Lansdowne's despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople of the 24th February last, No. 67.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,


Your most obedient Servant,


(Sd.) A. GODLEY.

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

G. C. Press, Simla.—No. 800 F. D.—L-6-04—22—C. P.

1





(Received on 20th June 1904 with Political Secretary's letter No. 23, dated 3rd June 1903.)

PERSIA AND ARABIA.

[May 9.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne,--(Received May 9.)

(No. 321.)

CONSTANTINOPLE;


MY LORD,

May 4th, 1904.

With reference to my telegram No. 70 of the 26th ultimo, respecting fighting in Arabia, I have the honour to report that I have received a telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad, replying to my inquiry as to whether the capture of Riyadh by Ibn Saud was correctly reported, and whether it was not meant that Ibn Saud had taken Hail. Major Newmarch states that he cannot learn whether Hail had been captured, but that Ibn Saud was in its vicinity; he had certainly taken Aneyza.

With reference to my telegram No. 77 of the 29th ultimo, I have received a telegram from Mr. Consul Crow, dated Bussorah, the 2nd May, stating that he is informed that the Turkish authorities will send on the Nejd expedition one battery of artillery and six battalions of infantry from the Bussorah and Baghdad Vilayets. Large numbers of camels have been seized by the Amir for transport, and contracts had been made for six months' supplies.

Mr. Crow also hears that the Sheikh of Koweit is in constant communication with Ibn Saud, and that the latter had taken Boreyda and Aneyza. He adds that the Sheikh may be obliged, by identity of interests, to lend assistance, or the support of his tribes may be withdrawn from him.




68

A telegram from Baghdad from Major Newmarch, dated the 2nd May, states that 400 infantry, 160 artillerymen with 2 field pieces, 4 mountain guns, and 6,000 rounds of ammunition had left, or were just leaving, for Samawa, and that these would be followed by a further contingent of 800 infantry.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.



(Received on 13th June with Political Secretary's letter No. 22, dated the 27th May 1904.)

KOWEIT.
CONFIDENTIAL.

[May 10.]
SECTION 1.

No. 1.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.

No. 177.

FOREIGN OFFICE,

May 10th, 1904.

SIR,

With reference to my despatch No. 67 of the 24th February last, I transmit to Your Excellency herewith copies of correspondence, as marked in the margin,* on the subject of hostilities in Nejd.

* India Office, April 29th; ditto, May 5th; ditto, May 9th, 1904.


The understanding arrived at with the Turkish Government in October 1901 provided that the two Governments should use their best endeavours to prevent hostilities between the Amir of Nejd and the Sheikh of Koweit. No stipulation was made that either Government should exercise influence with the object of preventing hostilities between the Amir of Nejd and the Saoud party.

At the same time, His Majesty's Government have, on more than one occasion, in the hope of assisting to preserve peace in that portion of Arabia, employed special efforts to dissuade the Sheikh of Koweit from taking part, even indirectly, in the hostilities which have broken out, and they have learned with regret that the Turkish Government, on their side, appear to contemplate giving active assistance to the Amir in this intertribal quarrel.

Your Excellency will observe that the Resident at Bushire will repeat to the Sheikh of Koweit the advice to observe an attitude of strict neutrality. Having regard to the above circumstances, and also to the further information contained in the Viceroy's important telegram of the 9th instant, it is clearly desirable that Your Excellency should communicate this fact to the Porte, and should take the opportunity to repeat the advice which you were authorised to give in my despatch above mentioned, and to express the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that no action will be taken by the Turkish Government which might add still further to the disturbed condition of this part of Arabia, the tranquillity of which is a matter of interest to His Majesty's Government as well as to that of the Sultan.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.





No. 172 (Confidential), dated Bushire, the 18th June 1904.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—L. W. DANE, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a despatch No. 28, dated 9th June 1904, addressed by His Majesty's Consul at Basrah to His Excellency the Ambassador at Constantinople, on the subject of Turkish interference in Nejd affairs.

Despatch No. 28 (Confidential), dated the 9th June 1904.

From—J. A. MONAHAN, Esq., His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul, Basrah,
To—SIR N. R. O'CONOR, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Constantinople.

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 24 and 25 of the 1st and 4th instant, respectively, and to previous telegraphic correspondence, I have the honour to report as follows:—

I learnt from a trustworthy source that on the 25th ultimo a telegram was received by the Wali of Basrah from the Mutesarrif of Diwanieh in the sense that troops had left Diwanieh for Samawa, and that £ T. 1,500 should be remitted at once for purposes connected with the expedition to Nejd. On the same day a telegram was received here from the Finance Minister at Constantinople ordering this money to be remitted. The amount was accordingly remitted on the 26th ultimo to Diwanieh or Samawa. This £ T. 1,500 was the balance due of the £ T. 4,000 assigned to the Basrah Vilayet as its contribution to the expenses of the expedition, the same sum £ T. 400 having also been assigned to each of the Vilayets of Baghdad and Mosul. A further £ T. 12,000 is in case of need to be taken from the 3 Vilayets for the expedition.

My informant said the number of troops, whose departure from Diwanieh for Samawa, had been reported was 12 battalions with 28 guns; these figures, however, would seem to be too high, especially the number of guns. It is possible that these were 12 paper battalions. It is certain that during the last 6 weeks or 2 months troops from the Baghdad, Basrah and Mosul Vilayets have been concentrating at Diwanieh and Samawa, and that troops moved from Diwanieh to Samawa towards the end of May, but I gather from various sources that there were not concentrated at Samawa more than about 12 battalions, or something over 4,000 men with perhaps 12 guns. It also appears that Ibn Rashid was at or in the immediate neighbourhood of Samawa in the latter half of May.

An eye-witness, who has since gone on to Koweit, reported that he saw a large Turkish force with Ibn Rashid's Arabs on the 30th ultimo at a place two days' journey from Samawa which is perhaps called Ain Salim. It is the first watering-place on the road from Samawa to Nejd. It seems uncertain whether Ibn Rashid himself came there with these troops from Samawa. The troops and tribesmen were waiting for stores from Samawa which, I hear, from another source consisted of three months' provisions for the troops. The Shammar Arabs had deserted the expedition, but the Aneyzas, who are less important, were with it. The whole number of Arab tribesmen with the expedition would be perhaps about 7,000. Large numbers of camels for the expedition were seized by Ibn Rashid.

The expedition has suffered from heat, and will suffer greatly even if the wells are not stopped as it has been rumoured they would be. I have heard that 70 Turkish soldiers had already deserted before the end of May.



(Received on the 27th June with Political Secretary's letter No. 24, dated 10th June 1904.)

KOWEIT.
CONFIDENTIAL

[May 16.]
SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 16.)
(No. 357.)

CONSTANTINOPLE;
May 11, 1904.

MY LORD,

With reference to my despatch No. 321 of the 4th instant, respecting the Wahabi campaign in Nejd, I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith copies of despatches from His Majesty's Consuls at Basrah and Jeddah reporting the victory of Bin Saud's followers over the Amir Ibn Rashid.

The letter inclosed in Mr. Crow's despatch shows beyond doubt that Sheikh Mubarak has been rendering assistance to Bin Saud, and departing from the neutral attitude which has been so often enjoined upon him by His Majesty's Resident at Bushire.

I have, etc.,

(Sd.) N. R. O'CONNOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 20.)

BASRAH;
April 11, 1904.

SIR,

I have the honour to forward, for Your Excellency's information, the translation of a letter addressed by Abdul Aziz Bin Saud, the Head of the Feysul family and Chief of the Wahabi party, to the Sheikh of Koweit, which the latter has recently sent me.

The letter gives an interesting account of the successful opening of the campaign against the Amir Ibn Rashid. The victory of the Wahabis is confirmed from other sources, and it is already reported, though perhaps prematurely, that Boreida has fallen.

In his covering letter to me, Mubarak states that Abdul Aziz has defeated the Amir, and established his authority over all Nejd and its tribes.

I have, etc.,

(Sd.) F. E. CROW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-es-Saud to Sheikh of Koweit.

(Translation.)

10 Muharram, 1322.

After compliments,—May God preserve you. We sent word to Your Highness before this by the hand of your servant Madi that it was our intention to set forth on an expedition. So we proceeded against Majid, and

49 (32)
72

he was in his tents in the region of Hamlan of Aneyza, and, by the help of God and with your assistance, we halted our camels over above Osheziyé at the break of day on Tuesday, the 4th day of Muharram. And we abode there, we and the people of Kassim who were with us, for the rest of that day. And the people of Aneyza who were with us sent men to their friends furtively to announce our coming. And when it was the fourth hour of the night we bestirred ourselves and came to Aneyza. There, when the eighth hour was come, we halted our camels at Ijhamiye, near to the town, and we left the people of Kassim to watch the villages, and, God helping them, they entered the town and slew Feheya-es-Sebhan and his company who were with him, and surrounded the family of Yabiya and their servants and a few men of the company of Feheya in the castle. And after we had said the morning prayer we sent against them Abdullah Ibn Ijlevi, with him 100 men of the people of Riad to assist. And we marched against Majia, and, when we saw the horsemen, God lifted his hand from off them and helped us against them. And we broke them and slaughtered of them 370 men. Among them were Obeyd-al Ilmadar-Rashid. And God restored to us our kinsmen of the family of Saud, who were prisoners in their hands—Saud Bin Abdul 'Aziz and Saud Bin Mohamed and Feysul Bin Saud. And, by Almighty God, but two Bedouins on our side were slain. Then we returned to the villages of our friends. And they had taken the castle and laid hands on the family of Yahia and those with them and slain them, and emptied the houses of the family of Bessam. And, by God, there went away with Majid but some fifteen camels and seven mares; and the rest of their army and their horses and their arms and their tents and their furniture we took as a spoil, by the help of God and with your assistance. And at this time all the people of Boreida have come over to us and the chief men of the people of the villages Kassim, all of them. And when they heard the news of our being in the neighbourhood, they who were in Ras and Meznil fled, and we settled those places. And as for Majid, the last news concerning him is that we set Boreida on his right hand and fled without his equipment.

And our intention, by the grace of God, is that we should speed to Boreida, if God wills. Now, when we saw the victory and triumph which had come to us of God, Sultan Abal Kheyl begged leave to bear the good news to you, and the rest of the message you will learn from him by word of mouth. Thus far. Greeting, etc.

(Sd.) ABDUL AZIZ-BIN-SAUD RAHMAN-ES-SAUD.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Consul Devey to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 39.)

JEDDAH;

April 22, 1904.

SIR,

I have the honour to state that news came here on the 13th instant that Bin Saud, having gathered a strong following of more than 5,000 men, attacked the towns of Kassim, Boreida and two others, and took them one after the other. In the meantime, having received assurances of co-operation from more than half the people of Aneyza, the chief town of Nejd, who are friendly inclined towards him, Bin Saud marched on Aneyza, and on the night of the 5th Muharram 1321 (22nd March 1904) entered the town without meeting any serious opposition.

The Sheikh, or Governor, of the town appointed by Bin Rashid was shot by the order of Bin Saud, and the houses of four leading men of Aneyza, who are supporters of Bin Rashid, were plundered. It is said that one of the Bessams, who are notables of that town, was killed, and the others have concealed themselves. Having established himself at Aneyza, Bin Saud wrote a letter to the Grand Shereef announcing his victories, and assuming the title



73
of Amir of Nejd, and sent it through a special messenger. This messenger was intercepted at Medina, and was sent to Mecca under arrest. It is not known what treatment he received at Mecca, but it is rumoured that the Turkish Government is taking steps to send troops to Nejd to support Bin Rashid and re-establish his authority, but I have been informed by a reliable person that Ahmed Ratib Pasha, the Vali of Hejaz, does not like Bin Rashid, and therefore he would be disinclined to act vigorously on his behalf.

I have, etc.,

(Sd.) G. P. DEVEY.

KOWEIT.
CONFIDENTIAL.

[May 21.]
SECTION 1.

No. 1.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

FOREIGN OFFICE;

May 21, 1904.

Fighting in Nejd.

I have repeated to you to-day a telegram from the Viceroy of India.

You should communicate at once with the Porte, and repeat in* urgent terms the representations you have no doubt already made on receipt of my despatch No. 177 of the 10th instant.

To prevent the Turks from pursuing the action they apparently contemplate is evidently of great importance.

We shall not return a reply to the Viceroy until we have received your answer.

My telegram No. 57 of the 17th March 1903 deals with the question of Russian intervention.

KOWEIT.
CONFIDENTIAL.

[May 23.]
SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 373.)

CONSTANTINOPLE;

May 16, 1904.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to report that, in obedience to Your Lordship's instructions, I called the Minister for Foreign Affairs' attention yesterday to the understanding arrived at between the two Governments in October 1901 in regard to Koweit, and reminded His Excellency that His Majesty's Government had upon several occasions cautioned the Sheikh Mubarak to abstain from interfering in the conflicts and disturbances which, unfortunately, existed in relatively close proximity to his territory.

I said that His Majesty's Government expected that, having adopted this attitude towards the Sheikh of Koweit, they had a right to expect that the Ottoman Government will do what they can to restrain the Amir of Nejd,



and to refrain from any action which might endanger peace in those regions, whose tranquillity is a matter of interest to His Majesty's Government as well as to that of the Sultan.

I purposely abstained from using more precise language, as I do not understand that it is Your Lordship's wish to go so far as to attempt to dissuade or prohibit the Ottoman Government from sending assistance to the Amir of Nejd in his difficulties with the Wahabi Pretender Ibn Saud, whose apparent object it is to conquer Hail and re-establish a Wahabi dynasty throughout the centre of Arabia—a result which might be fraught with serious consequences in the near future, and render our influence and authority at Koweit, which is yearly growing stronger under the actual condition of affairs, dangerously precarious.

I have, etc.,

(Sd.) N. R. O'CONOR.

KOWEIT.
CONFIDENTIAL.

[May 27.]
SECTION I.

No. 1.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Conor.—(Received at Foreign Office, May 27.)

(No. 21. Confidential.)

Sir,

BASRAH;

April 27, 1904.

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 18, 19 and 20, in regard to Nejd affairs, there seems no further doubt that the Ottoman Government intend to give the Amir Ibn Rashid material support in his struggle with Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, in order to check any expansion of the Wahabi faction, and gain a stronger hold on Central Arabia.

Troops are being sent from Baghdad, Basrah, Amara, Nasrieh and Nedjef to Samawa on the Euphrates, whence, it is reported, they will proceed to Aneyza with the Amir, and expel Ibn Saud from the places he has lately occupied. The Sheikh of Koweit has for a long time past supported Saud, either hoping thereby to extend his own power and benefit by the Wahabi successes, or, at least, to maintain his authority over the neighbouring Arab tribes, who now give him their allegiance, and protect his caravans in their commerce with the interior. Mubarak's political aims make the Turks the more ready to check the movement. I am informed that they are helping the Amir with arms secretly imported through the Basrah district. A private letter recently sent from Baghdad to a Basrah friend to the Sheikh of Koweit warns him that the Turks are preparing to assist the Amir with all possible speed, and that the forces will leave Samawa between the 1st and 6th May. The Sheikh is advised to destroy all wells on the road from Samawa to Kassin, and to hasten the despatch of men and provisions to the Wahabi camp. It is stated that the Mushir will send six battalions fully equipped, besides arms and ammunition, and a large sum of money. Turkish interference may presumably influence the Arab tribes round Koweit who adhere to Mubarak, and may induce them to join the Amir, unless the Sheikh exerts himself to protect them. In any case the hostilities are likely to hamper Koweit trade with the interior.


Koweit is an enclave in Turkish territory with no defined boundaries, and the Turks would readily avail themselves of any opportunity to circumscribe its limits in the hinterland by averting the sympathies of the tribes in that neighbourhood who owe allegiance to Mubarak. If the Sheikh of Koweit does not help these tribes in the struggle now pending between the Amir, who has gained Turkish support, and the Feysue faction at Riad, it is probable



that they will forsake him and join the stronger side, and Koweit trade and influence, which largely depends on their fidelity, must necessarily suffer. Bearing this in mind, the Sheikh of Koweit may be involuntarily drawn into the struggle, as his interests are identical with those of the Saud family.

I have, etc.,

(Sd.) F. E. CROW.



(Received on the 27th June with Political Secretary's letter No. 24, dated the 10th June 1904.)

Enclosure in Foreign Office covering letter No. 24 of 23rd May 1904.

Decypher Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 2698. Confidential.)

My despatch No. 373 and your telegrams Nos. 94 and 95.

On learning from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Jeddah that troops were assembling at Medina to assist Amir of Nejd, I drew Minister of Foreign Affairs' attention to my representations of May 16th, to the formidable proportions which



77
the question seemed to be assuming and to the serious consequences of a disturbance of the existing condition of things and of tranquillity in those regions.

Representations will perhaps make the Sultan pause, but they will hardly turn him from a course which he can fairly allege is calculated to prevent intestine troubles and disturbance of *status quo*.

I confess I do not see what arguments I can use or on what ground I can press Turks to desist from sending assistance to the Amir who is the party attacked without appearing to be a direct partisan of Ibn Saud whose covert menace of appealing to Russians is a familiar and artful Arab trick better calculated to alienate than encourage support.

My idea is that we should confine ourselves at all events for the present to maintaining intact territory of Sheikh of Koweit and watching developments; but if His Majesty's Government has a different view, I would be grateful for a clear line of policy.

If, however, Ottoman Government persist, as I imagine they will, in assisting Amir, it may be expedient to reconsider question of appointment of a British Resident in Koweit as suggested in Viceroy's telegram of May 20.

I shall hear what Minister of Foreign Affairs says today in reply to my representations of last Monday.

INDIA OFFICE; file 8x11
2nd June 1904. page 10

SIR,

With reference to the telegram from the Viceroy of the 29th May as to the affairs of Nejd, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to suggest, for the consideration of the Marquess of Lansdowne, that the reasons which the Government of India propose should be urged on the Turkish Government in order to restrain them from supporting Ibn Rashid should be explained to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople with a view to further representations to the Porte should Lord Lansdowne approve of this course.

Having regard, however, to the views expressed in Sir N. O'Connor's telegram of the 23rd May as to the attitude of the Sultan, Mr. Brodrick proposes, subject to Lord Lansdowne's concurrence, at once to authorise the Government of India to despatch an officer as Political Agent at Koweit.

As regards the importation of arms for Bin Saud, Mr. Brodrick, while not prepared to depart from our declared policy of suppressing the arms traffic, would suggest that action should be deferred on the proposals contained in the penultimate paragraph of my letter of the 18th May, forwarding the despatch from the Government of India of the 31st March, pending further explanations with the Turkish Government as to their support of Ibn Rashid.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient servant,

(Sd.) A. GODLEY,

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.



(Received on the 25th July with Political Secretary's letter No. 28, dated the 8th July 1904.)

KOWEIT.

[21st June.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir N. O'Connor.

No. 216.

Foreign Office,
21st June 1904.

Sir,

I transmit to Your Excellency herewith copies of correspondence with the India Office, as marked in the margin, on the subject of the hostilities now in progress in the Nejd.

You should make such use, as you think judicious, of the arguments suggested by the Government of India in their telegram of the 29th May, in support of your representations to the Turkish Government.

I have concurred in the proposals made in the second and third paragraphs of the India Office letter of the 2nd June.

I am, &c.,
LANDSDOWNE.

No. 2.

Foreign Office to India Office.


Foreign Office,
21st June 1904.

Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 2nd June, on the subject of the hostilities in progress in the Nejd, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to enclose, for the information of the Secretary of State for India in Council, copy of a despatch which has been addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, forwarding to him the observations of the Government of India for such use in his communications with the Porte as he may think judicious.

I am to state that Lord Lansdowne concurs in Mr. Brodrick's proposal to authorise the immediate despatch of a Political Agent to Koweit, and to defer for the present any fresh measures for the prevention of importation of arms at that port.

I am, &c.,
T. H. SANDERSON.





Confidential

To F.A.

53 80

Bushie
in charge of current duties

No. 48 Df. Koweit
17/10/4.

Sir,

I have the honour to
report, for the information
of the ~~Govt of India~~ & the
Resident, that I returned
to Koweit on the evening
of the 16th ~~th~~ October.

2. In the morning,
Sheikh Mobarak at once
came to visit me & gave
me the following
information regarding
affairs in
New at Hejd.

"On the 16th Rajab
= 27th September, Ibn
Rashid broke up his
camp at Shanayneh &
began to march. His



Aljail was uncertain but
probably he commenced
a retreat towards Hail.
In the course of the
second day's march,
Abdul Aziz bin Saood
^{at Kaer bin Agazil}
fell upon him & the
result of the encounter
is said to have been
an utter rout. 550 Turkish
^{& 330 men of Hail}
soldiers were killed &
Bin Saood's men took
two days thoroughly to
plunder the tents at
Kaer bin Agazil. Three
standards have reached
Koweit. Bin Rashid
is said to have been
seen severely wounded
riding away from the fight
& his shattered party such
as he could keep together
made their retreat with
the following transport:
40 loading camels
12 horses
9 mules.
Sheikh Hobanuk cap



that the few remaining
soldiers who did not^{54.}
die in the fighting will
in all probability die
of hunger & thirst in the
desert."

3 This news reached
Koweit on the ~~14th~~ morning
of the 15th & I heard a
rough version at 8.30 the
same evening ~~but the~~ as
I was on the point of
starting but the extreme
difficulty of sending
Confidential Telegrams from
that office prevented me
from sending ^{as far as} the sooner
as I could have wished.

4. Sheikh Mubarak
concluded his account
of what had happened at
Hejd with the embarrassing
question "What am I to
say to Bin Saud who
wants to know whether
he is to write to the
Turk or not about this
matter?"




5. I replied that in the
absence of instructions
from my Government
neither ~~to~~ ^{Hijabarak} nor I could
give Bani Saood any
advice & that he must
tell Bani Saood to act
as he thought best.
advice to Bani Saood
who must consult his
own interests & act
as he thinks best.


6. This news is evidently
believed at Koweit
where there are signs
of great rejoicing at
Bani Saood's victory


I have &c


J. M. W.





000














Report

59 (61)
88

At the Sheikh's visit last ^{Mon. 18th} Friday, he gave the following news re the situation in Hejra.

"About six days ago, the Wali of Buscrah replied to a letter from Abdul Rahman bin Saood to the Wali's agent.

That letter was telegraphed to Constantinople; its tone was submissive & conciliatory. Bin Saood said that he was an old servant of the Sultan, that Ibn Rashid was the aggressor & that Bin Saood was ready to obey all the Sultan's orders."

The Wali's reply, inspired from Constantinople, was that Bin Saood's offers of service had been accepted by the Sultan, that he was not to go to the foreigners & that the Turks would treat ^{with honor} for the establishment of an officer in St-Kasim & that they wished Sheikh Moobarak to



Come into the scheme." 89

Sheikh Noorak said that all this was rumour & unconfirmed.

The Turkish lira is cheap in the bazaar & has fallen from Rs 14 as 2 to Rs 13.15.6. The reason for this is said to be the number of looted Turkish liras brought in by the Bedonnis who plundered Ibn Rashid.

The Bedonnis who have come in with the Boreyda & Auzza merchants whose arrival was reported in ^{last} week's diary are said to have a number of Turkish soldiers' tents & clothes with them & are wearing the fez in mockery.


General bazaar rumour has it that Ibn Saood is coquetting with the Turks & would like to enter their service & undertake to be





responsible for the peace ^{(62) 60}
security of Hjd but he knows ⁹⁰
that this cannot be done
without Sheikh Mubarak's
help. No one in the bazaar
dares to speculate on what
the Sheikh's attitude will be

J. M. R. Captain
P.O. Agent Kowcit.

20/11/4









Copy of a despatch No 58 dated 25th November 1904, from J. H. Monahan Esq., His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul Bussorah, to W. B. Townley Esq., His Britannic Majesty's Charge d'Affaires, Constantinople.



With reference to my despatch No 51 of the 7th ultimo and to telegrams Nos 61 of the 5th and 66 of the 25th instant, I have the honour to report as follows:-


Many letters were received here towards the end of October brought by a messenger from Ibn Saood to the effect that Ibn Rashid came out from Shenana on the 17th Rejib (21st September) with the Turkish force and the 3 or 4 guns which were still serviceable and tried to bombard a castle about an hour from Shenana called Kasr Ibn Akil in which was Ibn Saood's friend the Sheikh of Boreyda. Ibn Saood came out from Al Russ and then was a fight when Ibn Rashid almost immediately fled, no one knows whither, perhaps to Hail, and the Turkish force also fled with him. Much booty, including camels horses and provisions, was left, and one gun which was taken by Ibn Saood. Only a few were killed - I hear from another source only 13 on Ibn Rashid's side namely 3 soldiers and 10 Arabs. Ibn Rashid and his men and the Turkish soldiers were before the fight exhausted, and demoralised, and there was much disaffection. Prisoners do not appear to have been taken, the Arabs of Ibn Saood being too busy collecting booty.

The messenger was detained here in custody for 24 hours by the acting Vali who questioned him and then let him go with a small present having heard that he had been beaten here by some soldiers and by some friends of Ibn Rashid.

I understand that exaggerated reports of the victory have reached Koweit. Nothing however to contradict the above version in the letters has been received here by either Ibn Rashid's or Ibn Saood's party, and I hear that the Field Marshal at Baghdad has received a confirmatory report from Ibn Rashid himself; so I gather that this

version





version is in the main true.

The great efforts of the Government which have been going on for the past 3 weeks to collect money for the purchase of camels for Ibn Rashid are evidence of its truth.

All the leading Mussulmans of Busrah, even Ibn Saood's friends, the rich Jews, and even some Christians, have been forced by the moral pressure of acting Vali Fakhri Pasha, though in a kind and gentle manner, to give sums from 5 to 30 liras each. About 4000 liras have, I hear, been collected from Bussorah town, and the collection is going on in other parts of the Vilayet. Probably about 7000 liras will be collected from the whole vilayet.

The new Vali, Mukhlis Pasha, who landed here from the Russian steamer from Constantinople on the 19th instant has not been taking any direct active part in the collection but the police were yesterday still collecting in the town.

Fakhri Pasha starts tomorrow for Baghdad. He has left the best impression here of energy honestly and successfully shown in maintaining order in the Vilayet and especially in Bussorah town. During his two months stay there has been in the town a degree of security perhaps never before known.

No 1489 of 1904.

British Residency and Consulate-General.

Bushire, 6th December, 1904


Copy forwarded to the Political Agent, Koweit, for information.


Freeman
Captain,

First Assistant to the

Political Resident in the

(In charge Current Affairs) Persian Gulf.





To the
P.R.
N^o 135 of 4.1.1905.

Sir,


I have the honour to report that, on the 30th Dec., I visited Sheikh Inobarak at his encampment at Shanilat-ul-Lah about 12 miles from Jaha.

2. The Sheikh informed me that, during my absence on tour, letters had reached him from H.E. the Wali of Brusa, purporting to send the orders of the Sultan that Bin Saood & Sheikh Inobarak were to come & meet H.E. at Sefwan with a view to some arrangement being come to as to the future of Hejd.



3. These letters reached ⁹⁵ Sheikh Mubarak sometime before the 23rd December for the open letter to Bin Saood which Mubarak was to read & despatch left for Riadh on Saturday the 24th December & should have reached Bin Saood at the time Sh: Mubarak & myself were discussing the situation on the 30th.

4. The letter to Sheikh Mubarak was, so he told me, couched in very friendly terms, & promised him that he should be made ruler of Hejd & more than Hejd. The letter to Bin Saood was also friendly but Mubarak was emphatic ^{it said that} on the point that nothing could or would be done for Bin Saood, unless





present time.

7. The present juncture appears to a certain extent critical & I would solicit the favor of instructions as to what course I should pursue in the event of a visit of Bni Saood to Koweit.

8. In the absence of any instructions, I propose to endeavour to make Bni Saood's acquaintance & if he ^{mentions} touches on the subject of protection to say that I have duly forwarded his letters but that no reply has been received as yet.

9. Sheikh Inobarak will be out hawking for a few days in the neighbourhood but should return to Koweit about the 4th or 5th of January. I have be
Sh.



Roweit 66
7/1/57 98

Dear Mr. Humahan,

I must apologise
for not having replied
before to your confidential
letters of 21st Dec. & 23rd

no copies

The fact is that I
have been out in camp &
Sheikh Muabarak also.
The latter only returned
last night.

I have little news
about the Turkish troops
in Chkaffa but Sheikh
Muabarak tells me that
after the fighting there
were only 800 left & that
since then they have had
Cholera. No news has
reached him about
the Medina soldiers




except the Reuter's telegram
which I communicated 99
to him of the despatch of
four Syrian battalions.


You ask about ^{former} Lonnier
& Beveridge. The ~~latter~~
must have reached you
some time back & the
~~former~~ ^{latter} is, I believe,
either in Alway or
on his way there.


Many thanks for your
Xmas message. Mine
is so belated that I
am ashamed to send it.

About the fort at Fao
Moharak has promised
to let me have the
documents to morrow.
The translation will
probably take me some
time & I must write
again.

Yours sincerely
J. K. R.







Extract from the diary of the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia for the week ending the 6th November 1904.

Under date, the 28th October 1904, the Vice-Consul at Kerbala reports as follows:—

"Some time ago Arabs of the Aniza tribe who are hostile to the Amir of Jabal (Ibn Rashid) came to buy provisions, and have since then encamped themselves between Kerbala and Nejd. They tampered with the telegraph wire to Nejd and are giving trouble to pilgrims—pelting stones at the carriages going to Nejd. A few days ago they caught some pilgrims and stripped them even off their clothes. The authorities have not yet been able to cope with them."

Extract from the diary of the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia for the week ending the 13th November 1904.

The Vice-Consul at Kerbala reports that the Redifs (Reserves) are being called out at Kerbala, Nejd, and Hillah, because the regular troops are going to help Abdul Aziz, the Amir of Jabal, against Ibn Saoud. The Redifs of Nejd will be stationed in Kerbala, those of Kerbala in Hillah, and those of Hillah in Nejd. He says this has caused great uneasiness among the people.

It is stated at Baghdad that 25 battalions in all are going to join Abdul Aziz.



"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [٧٠ظ] (٣٨٦/١٤٠)





69 11
102

48

Another rumour current here, perhaps also originated by my Russian Colleague, is that there are several English officers disguised as Arabs fighting for Ibn Saoud. I hope this silly story will not lead to any obstruction being put in the way of Mr. Lorimer and Lieutenant Gabriel.

(Received on 12th December 1904 with Political Secretary's letter No. 43, dated the 25th November 1904.)

KOWEIT.

[26th SEPTEMBER.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 4.

No. 1.

SIR N. O'CONOR to the MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE—(Received 6th September).

(No. 736.)

Therapia,

20th September 1904.

MY LORD,

With reference to my despatch No. 720 of the 12th instant, reporting the despatch from Medina of Turkish soldiers to reinforce the troops with Ibn Rashid, I have the honour to report that the Minister of War has informed Colonel Maunsell that the previous force of four battalions, sent to assist the Amir* of Nejd, having suffered defeat and the loss of the Colonel at Kassim, where it was now holding a defensive position, a relief force had to be despatched, consisting of three battalions, under Aarif Pasha, an energetic staff officer, who joined the Yemen corps two years ago.

* Ibn Rashid.

The Minister of War said he thought these troops must have now effected a junction with the other force at Kassim, and that the total strength of seven battalions would be quite sufficient to drive off Ibn Saoud's men. His Excellency enlarged to Colonel Maunsell on the great difficulties of the want of water and supplies along the route from Medina, and said that a column of 3,000 men was all that could be properly provided for, but that others might follow if required. He also mentioned that the Wahibis under Ibn Saoud were in possession of some old iron cannon dating from the time of Ibrahim Pasha's invasion of the Nejd from Egypt.

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have just received from His Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad, containing details of the alleged treacherous killing of the Turks in question by Ibn Rashid himself during the conflict with Ibn Saoud, but I have not yet been able to obtain any confirmation of this version of the affair at Kassim.

I have, etc.,

N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Consul-General NEWMARCH to SIR N. O'CONOR.

Baghdad,

10th August 1904.

(No. 44.)

SIR,

In continuation of my telegram of the 10th instant about the treacherous killing of some Turks by Ibn Rashid, I have the honour to submit herewith the further details promised in that telegram.



103

49

2. It is reported that the Vali has received a telegram from Osman Pasha, of Medina, to the following effect :—

Ibn Rashid has killed the Meer Alai (Commander) of the troops sent to assist him against Ibn Saoud, because he refused to march the troops in front of Ibn Rashid's Arabs. Ibn Rashid then ordered Bimbashi Ramzan Agha (the second in command) to march the troops in advance of his Arabs, and during a fight with Ibn Saoud's Arabs Ibn Rashid's Arabs fired at the troops, killing 100 and wounding 90. Among the killed were Bimbashi Ramzan Agha, a Captain of Artillery, and 19 Zabats (Lieutenants).

It is said that the Vali is doing his utmost to suppress this news. He admits that the Turks lost heavily in an engagement with Ibn Saoud, but states that Ibn Saoud was eventually defeated and had to beat a retreat.

I have, etc.,

L. S. NEWMARCH, Major,
Political Resident in Turkish Arabia.

(Received on 12th December 1904 with Political Secretary's letter No. 48, dated the 25th November 1904.)

KOWEIT.

[14TH NOVEMBER.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

MR. TOWNLEY to the MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE, (Received 14th November).

Constantinople,
8th November 1904.

(No. 862, Secret.)

MY LORD,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith copies of papers, which I have received from a secret source, containing information about the present state of affairs in Nejd.

As Your Lordship is aware, there has been much fighting recently in that region between Ibn Saoud and Ibn Rashid, who both claim the title of Emir. The latter has recently been assisted by Turkish troops, and for some time past there have been conflicting rumours as to which side was victorious.

Latterly a conviction has been gaining ground that Ibn Saoud has won the day, a surmise which is borne out by the accompanying documents, of the genuineness of which I have been able to assure myself by the corroborative evidence I have collected in various directions.

Having heard rumours of a proposed movement of troops to the Yemen or Nejd, I asked the Grand Vizier and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw together on the 3rd instant, whether they could give me any information as to the real destination of the troops, which I understood were being sent from Aleppo and other places to Arabia. I was not at that moment in possession of the inclosed papers, but I gathered from their somewhat lame answers that the projected expedition had some object which they were unwilling to communicate to me.

The accompanying copy of a despatch from Colonel Maunsell, Military Attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, reporting information acquired at the War Department, shows that the troops were destined for Central Arabia, to avenge a defeat suffered by Ibn Rashid and the Turkish troops at the hands of Ibn Saoud. The Minister of War further told Colonel Maunsell that preparations for the dispatch of the expedition were now suspended in consequence of a letter having been received from Ibn Saoud, presumably the accompanying letter from his father to the Acting Vali of Bussorah, asking for pardon and tendering his submission.



70 72
104

50

It is possible also that the Turkish Government may have been influenced in coming to this decision by a report addressed to them, as I am informed by His Majesty's Consul at Jeddah, by Ahmed Ratib Pasha. Vali of the Hedjaz, in favour of Ibn Saoud, who is represented by His Excellency as being of the dynasty of the old rulers of Nejd, and that to take him into favour would do away for ever with disturbances in that country, since the large majority of the people side with him. Whatever may be the reason of the change in the plans of the Turkish Government, I think that they are well advised to hesitate before sending a strong military expedition composed of troops quite unfitted for the purpose to the heart of Arabia against a foe who would have all the natural advantages of the country on his side.

The arms and ammunition to which allusion is made in Colonel Maunsell's despatch are to be forwarded by the Austrian Lloyd steamer "Calypso," which has been chartered for the purpose by the Turkish Government.

I have, etc.,

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

FAKHIR PASHA, Acting Vali of Bussorah, to the GRAND VIZIER.

8th (21st) October 1904.

I regret to report that the rumours of Ibn Rashid's retirement to Hail are confirmed by the inclosed letter from Abdurrahman-ibn-Feisal, father of Abdul Aziz-el-Saoud, addressed to me *via* Koweit, and apparently written at Koweit for Abdurrahman.

Inclosure.

I heard of your arrival at Bussorah as Acting Vali and of your loyalty, so I report the following :—

My family has of old been known to be loyal to the State, and especially to the Commander of the Faithful. But certain intriguing officials, egged on by the tyrant Ibn Rashid, have calumniated us. As soon as I heard this, I telegraphed to the Palace and wrote to the Vali of Bussorah and the Commander of the Army Corps, and begged that a full account might be sent to the Sultan. Ibn Rashid and his following deceived the Government, and, contrary to all expectation, brought about the dispatch of troops. We refused at first to believe this. Subsequently, Ibn Rashid and the troops arrived near the village of Bekirié.* Seeing this, all the inhabitants of Nejd and Kasim united and prepared for war, so as to prevent Ibn Rashid's tyrannical murderous designs. Ibn Rashid attacked them. My son, Abdul Aziz, being there with his followers, prepared, retired from in front of the troops and urged the tribes to attack Ibn Rashid's band. Hereupon Ibn Rashid, seeing himself hard-pressed, fled to the troops, and in the ensuing encounter was defeated and routed. The soldiers lost 210 killed, and six guns fell into the hands of the people of Nejd. My son, Abdul Aziz, ordered the people to leave them at the village of Bekirié(?)

Thus this service proceeded from our affection and loyalty to the State. Abdul Aziz-el-Saoud constantly designed to communicate with the Commanders of the troops and ascertain their desires, and to telegraph to the Palace, but Ibn Rashid sent out men to apprehend him, and seized all the letters and telegrams. After the encounter, which was on the 29th Rebiel Akhbir, 1322, † we remained expectant. But Ibn Rashid would not rest, marched his following and the troops against the people of Kasim, and began to press them hard.

On the 17th Rejeb, 1322, ‡ he was attacked, defeated, and routed, many of his following being killed, all his tents, stores, and other possessions taken,

* El-Bukirich, between Hail and Boreidoh, about half way.—(F. R. MAUNSELL.)
† 13th July 1904. ‡ 27th September 1904.



and it is unlikely that he will again make head. On this occasion also my son, Abdul Aziz, and our relatives prevented the Moslem population of Nejd from molesting the troops, but as they followed the same road as that which Ibn Rashid had taken, they did not rest in Kasim. I am convinced that their departure is due to the machinations of Ibn Rashid. For neither the Sovereign nor his Ministers would ever allow their subjects to be harassed.

I beg that our tender of loyalty may be accepted as heretofore, and that my condition may be reported to His Majesty. I am ready to perform any service to the State, and guarantee on oath the security of the roads and pilgrims. I beg that my submission may be accepted, and that we may not be left in despair. Despair makes men commit any crime. I repeat my prayer, and beg that my pension, some months in arrear, may be paid. The big guns with the soldiers are now with the people of Nejd. They remain in my son's possession. I await your orders.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

The GRAND VIZIER to the MINISTER of the INTERIOR.

17th (30th) October 1904.

The measures respecting the dispatch of troops to Kasim against Ibn Saoud have been concerted in communication with Feizi Pasha. The following decisions have been sanctioned by His Majesty :—

The dispatch of eight battalions from the 6th Ordou, one cavalry regiment four battalions from Medina, besides from Syria and Adana, eight battalions of the best trained Redifs, not to fall below 600 each; dispatch by the Abdul Kader of four battalions of Redifs from the said Ordou, and from it also the requisite guns, as well as four Maxim mitrailleuses from the Selimie barracks at Constantinople, together with munitions; levy and embarkation of the troops from Adana as soon as such steamer arrives there, sufficiency of munitions of war to be sent by a steamer to be chartered from the Lloyd Company, which will call at Adana, where eighty mules capable of conveying stores are to be prepared and embarked at Mersina; the troops and munitions to disembark at Beyrout, proceed to Syria, thence by Hedjaz Railway to Maan, thence to Acre (? Akaba), and so by special steamer to Yambo, whence they will march *via* Mecca and Medina to Kasim.

The aforesaid has been communicated by the Minister of War, and the necessary orders have been given in haste, and you are hereby instructed to take such measures in accordance as fall within the scope of your Ministry.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL MAUNSELL to MR. TOWNLEY.

Constantinople,

8th November 1904.

(No. 68.)

SIR,

I have the honour to report that recently plans have been drawn up for sending reinforcements into Central Arabia to restore the prestige of the Turkish troops after the defeat by Ibn Saoud of Ibn Rashid's forces whom they were assisting.

Four battalions, two of Nizam and two of Redif, were ordered to be ready to be start from Aleppo, embark at Alexandretta, thence to Damascus by Beyrout by the new Hedjaz Railway to Maan by march route to Akaba, there embark for Yambo, whence they could march to Medina and join the expeditionary force there for Kasim. Other troops were to be sent from Baghdad and Bussorah towards the Nejd, but no orders were actually sent to the 6th Corps head-quarters.



52

I saw the Minister of War to-day, who told me that preparations for sending troops were now suspended, and that probably no expedition would be sent, as Ibn Saoud had sent a letter to the Sultan asking pardon and tendering submission, so that the matter would be arranged amicably.

No troops at all would be sent from the Baghdad side, but very likely four or, perhaps, six Aleppo battalions would be sent to Medina, but nothing had been actually decided.

The Minister told me that actually at the present time Ibn Rashid was shut up by Ibn Saoud's forces in the old fortress of Hail, his capital. The Chief of the staff and other officials confirmed the above information.

The troops of the 6th or Baghdad Corps are still armed with the old Martini rifle, now much worn, and practically the same weapon as possessed by Ibn Saoud's men. It has now been decided to issue them the Mauser rifle like the rest of the army, and for this purpose 40,000 small-bore Mausers and also six batteries of the newer pattern of 7.5 centim. mountain guns, made in the arsenal here, have been packed up, and are awaiting shipment by an early steamer for Bussorah.

I have, etc.,

F. R. MAUNSELL, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Military Attaché.

(Received on 12th December 1904, with Political Secretary's letter No. 48, dated the 25th November 1904).

[Enclosure in Foreign Office covering letter of 21st November 1904.]

19th November 1904.

Decypher MR. TOWNLEY, PERA (despatched 7-35, received 10-15 P.M.).

No. 169.

My despatch No. 862. Nejd hostilities.

Following from Consular Officer at Jeddah:—


"An Agent, claiming to represent France and Russia, whether conjointly or separately, is said to have attempted to communicate [group undecypherable] Ibn Rashid of Nejd, but failed: Porté was informed.


"Six battalions were leaving Syria *via* Akaba and Yembo for Nejd and the [?] battalions, mentioned in my telegram of September 12, have already probably started."

I have not been able to learn anything here in confirmation of the first paragraph of above telegram.

To the Marquess of Lansdowne.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 2863 F. D.—17-12-1904.—14—W. H. D'R.








108

may have farreaching results
if it comes off, as it seems
likely to. I have wired the situa-
tion to Foreign & will get "Sphinx"
over if I can, but the position
as regards Kuwait is so very
delicate just now between
the Indian & Home Gov^{ts} that
I do not like to take liberties.
If "Sphinx" does not go






110
-dently one which cannot be
hurriedly dealt with & that
you have as yet received no
instructions from your Govt.
and are therefore not in a
position to give him any
information on the subject.

The above will not be very satis-
-fying to him or satisfactory
to ^{to impart} you, but more than that
we cannot say, & he must
be especially careful not to
give him reason to say that
he had had any encourage-
ment from us. Sd P.L.C.




"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [٧٦و] (٣٨٦/١٥١)





"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [٧٦ظ] (٣٨٦/١٥٢)








112

get no support from us & he
did -

You should repeat these
warnings to the Sheikh, and
also his own promise to abide
implicitly by the Viceroy's advice.


A meeting with bin Saood
is to be avoided unless he act-
ually enters Koweit and you can-
not get out of it without dis-
-courtesy; but you should express
no opinions to him, nor should
you offer Sheikh Ambarak





"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [٧٨ظ] (٣٨٦/١٥٦)








that he was abiding ¹¹⁵
by his promise which
he had not forgotten
& confirmed his words
when he came to see
me this morning by a
letter to your address
which he asked me
to read through.

I enclose it herewith

Yours sincerely
A. M. A.




Extract from a D 10 letter
of 24.1.05 from Mr. J. H.
Monahan, H.B.M.'s Consul
Birsach to P.A. Hewitt.


x x x x x

I received yesterday
your letter of the 20th enclosing
the Shikah's letter about
G. el. Ibrahim. We
have heard nothing of the
matter here. About a
month ago the same
report reached us, but
turned out to be
unfounded. I will at once
make the necessary
inquiries of Baghdad.

x x x x x

N.A.S.
18.7.05.





D/Koweit
15/2/5. 17

copy

My dear Major,
In continuation of
my note of yesterday, Sheikh
Jabri called to see me
this morning & informed
me that a letter came
last night from Sheikh Hobarak,
which gave the following
information.


H. E. the Wali of
Bussorah came last
Wednesday (8th Feb 5) &
us. I said to him 'I have
nothing to do with affairs
in he'd. This is Bin Saood
& you can settle matters
with him.' There was a
long conference & late
in the afternoon H. E.
returned to Bussorah
& on Monday night at 9 p.m.
came back to Hobarak
& Bin Saood's camp
& brought an order



from Constantinople appointing
Bini Saood ruler of Hejd on 118
behalf of the Turkish
Government. The Govt.
will put soldiers in El-
Kasim & there will be
official relations between
us (i. e. Bini Saood) & them
& all of you will be in the
service of the Sultan. As
for Bini Rashid, he shall
have nothing to do with
affairs in Hejd.

I have allowed the
account of popular
rumor, written by my
Clerk, to remain in
being but I think this
is more reliable. From
the way Sh. Jabri told me
the message I do not think
"all of you" (see above)
was meant to include
Sh. Inobarak. I think it
is a good sign that Jabri
came round so promptly
to tell me the news.

Yours sincerely
J. Meo





on the situation. This Sh. 120
Mobarak steadily refused
to do.

Bui Saood was then
summoned & presented
his case. He said that
he & his friends had
petitioned the Ottoman
Government against Bui
Rashid & his tyranny
but no answer was
returned to their petitions.
They then took the law
into their own hands & had
crushed Bui Rashid.
The result was that Bui
Rashid returned with
soldiers & intercepted
all the messengers Bui
Saood was sending to the
Sultan & Abdur Rahman
Bui Saood could get no
redress. They then fought
with Bui Rashid & the
soldiers.

5. Kiteurain
with Bui Saood.



He then went on to say ⁸² "When
H.E. wrote to me, I came ¹²¹ at
your orders. I will not
have Bin Rashid interfering
in his affairs & will fight
him if he comes with soldiers.
I will not resist the Turkish
Government, provided
Bin Rashid is kept away
from me & my people.
You have however no
right & no interest in our
countries & our people
hate the soldiers.

6. The Wali
leaves.

H.E. then went off saying
that he must communicate
with Constantinople.

7. 2nd interview

On the night of the 14th,
H.E. returned with a
telegram from Constantinople,
to Gishamya where the
two Sheikhs were encamped.

8. Terms of
Settlement

At the first point in the
telegram was that Bin
Rashid was to have




nothing to do with Hejd affairs. ~~fact~~ 122

The second: Govt. would B. seize El Kasim. To this Bui Saood made no objection.

The third: Sheikh Hobanek C. must be a party to the agreement. The Sheikh flatly refused to consent. He said that the people of Hejd were a seditious turbulent lot, that he allowed them to have trade relations with his city but kept only one man there. He pointed out how the newspapers had been busy with his name, saying that he had been sending high prices & money & provisions to Hejd which was utterly untrue & that he refused to have anything

G. H. Hobanek's opinion



123 to do with he'd politics. 83

As soon as the conference was over, he would go

to Hageyja & Abdul Rahman to Jahra.

Their ways lay apart.

Abdul Rahman was his friend & Bin Rashid

his enemy & he hoped with all from his heart that Abdul Rahman would get the better of Bin Rashid.

That, as regards the arrangement, he hoped

that matters would go well

but that, if they did not,

H. E. must settle the question with Shi Saood;

Sh. Muबारاك would have nothing to do with

it & was not in any way responsible.

The question
10. of British
protection.

The question of British protection was discussed & Sheikh Muबारاك was



asked by H. E. to say ¹²⁴
What were his desires
& H. E. would fulfill
them. Sheikh Mobarak
replied that he wanted
nothing & as regards
abandoning the British
"If you were to give me
all Bneerak, I would
not do it. The relations
between us, especially
of trade & friendship,
are of long standing &
what you ask is impossible.
Nothing new has taken
place. You have never
had any authority in
my town & I have committed
no breach of friendship
against your Government.
All my affairs & my
vessels are protected
by the English. If I
ventured on such a
course of action, my

I have come here
& brought Bin
Saood at your
request & at great
expense to myself.
This alone is a
proof of my friendly
feeling towards you.



subject would not support me & would leave me for the English." 125

11. Bash Katib.

Not understood.
Perhaps Bussarat
or Constantinople
could explain.

The Wali then asked him if he had not written to the Bash-Katib at Constantinople & Sheikh Kibarak denied having done so.

12. General remarks & Subsequent conversation with Sheikh Kibarak.

All the above was said slowly & steadily & was evidently the impression which Sh. Kibarak wished to convey to the British Govt. of what had taken place at Sefwan. It had been

I should say, carefully studied & rehearsed.
Turkish soldiers in Sefwan.

I asked Sh. Kibarak what was going to be done about soldiers. He said that men were to be posted in Aweyz & Bonezda but not at Riadh. Abdu Rahman would not allow that.

He said that the



Mushai of Bagdad was ¹²⁶
under orders to proceed
& settle the administration
but he refused to go,
pleading sickness. I
had heard this from
another source.

I mentioned that the R. I. M. S. Investigator
Investigator was expected
shortly to complete the
work she had begun. The
Sheikh made no objection
but said that the Wali
had attacked him on this
point also when he
explained that the work
of the Investigator was
merely concerned with
collecting information
about the harbor & to
ensuring the safety of
vessels, a laudable occupation,
business to which no one
could reasonably take
exception.



Mr. Goguyer's rifles

38 25
127


I then said that I had
already some days back
~~that~~ informed Sheikh
^{bin Jubair} Jaber, that Mr. Goguyer
had sent a box full of
rifles to Koweit from
Muscat. The Sheikh
said that such a thing
was quite impossible,
that he had turned
Goguyer out of Muscat
& he had since been writing
scandalous articles to
the newspapers about
him & that, if such a
thing came to his knowledge,
he would promptly
confiscate the entire
cargo of the vessel.

I thanked the Sh. for all
the information he had
given me & expressed my
pleasure at his return
to Koweit. The Sheikh
at once took up the same
tube, was unusually



profuse in professions ¹²⁸
of friendship & attachment.
He told me that travelling
in the desert would be
delightful in a few days' time
that he was going out
to Suria & beyond & hoped
I would accompany him.
I mention these latter
trifles, as I consider them
important indications
of the Sheikh's attitude
at the present juncture.
~~He~~ ^{he} is no barak is not
fushing as a rule & I
think that ^{as to the} is distinctly
nervous of what view
the British may take of
his Sefwan policy.

I have no reason to suppose
that his account of what
took place is incorrect generally
though no doubt




Page 119




Communication might
not be addressed to
the Sheikh approving the
Correct attitude taken
up by him - according
to his own statement -
on this occasion.

I have

M.







132

Overleaf copy of letter referred

to in P. R. no. 344 of 7/3/5


18/3/5






١٣٣

من مخرج كاكس باليونان له دولة البوسنة القيصريّة في خليج فارس
 الإقطاع الكرم الرخيم النخعي عمدة الإقطاع في خليج مبارك الصباح المحترم
 سلمه المستفاد وان شاء الله تعالى فالحاجة إلى كتابه كود ودرج هو له عزيل
 السلام وله الدولة حاكم على الدوام وبه يكون معلوم جنابكم الشريف
 بأن محكم من قبله كشوقكم يوم في البحر في الحال وصلنا فيه بوجوه بالسر
 وكثير من أسروين حين وصلنا إلى الإقطاع كما نريد جنابكم بالجماعة النخعي
 القبطان ناكس صاحب الشجرة من انقطاع المجلس في صفون ومن جرت
 مناسبة للولك الذي كان بقضائكم اجريتموه في ذات الحضر فيضين
 انتم استغنتم كانه شاهد عاد لآب وون عيف وميل وتجنتم عن
 الفضول في مواد بن مسعود وامور سياسية اتحد جنابكم ذوق طاعة ودرية
 ولا حظون للمواقب اننا ان شاء الله تعالى ما نفعل نرفع هذه المواد لا الله
 البوسنة القيصريّة في خليج فارس وبلا شك جنابكم يبلغ سماع الدولة العظمى بها هذه
 الخبر ما هو يكون موجب غاية الاستحسان والسرور حيث انتم اجريتم على وفق
 لخدمة الدولة الزبوره وفر خصوص البحر في لايه بلغ جنابكم عن قوتها
 هناك حيث اننا من شرين قبل رايينا احوال مناة البحر في نقوشه
 وعدم امنية للقاضين في البلدة وكسب كما بان لنا احوال الشيخ
 عيسى بن احمك البحر في احكامه واستماعه الى اقوال اهل التزوير المعينين
 ولذا اننا ما نحن لنا ان نترك هذه الاحوال تدوم والحال المحمدي
 اتفقنا له في جنابكم في خليج عيسى بن علي حاكم البحر في دولة البوسنة القيصريّة
 الزكليس ما لها ما دى الارز في البلدة وامنية للتجار ورفاهية نفس
 الشيخ وعلاقته التي في متعلقة باتحاد واتفاقه مع الدولة الشارليها
 واذا جنابكم تستحقون زيادة الرطاح في الامور المحاذية في البحر
 جنابكم كما ليجاه القبطان ناكس صاحب بشرى لكم كيفية ما جرت
 فالمرجوز من سيجتم وفطانتكم اذا بين جنابكم وجنابكم في خليج عيسى
 مراسلة يكون تنصونه فيما يصلح شانه هذه المراسم ببيان لجنابكم ولانتم
 محروسين ما توفيقكم
 عرضت ذهابي احوالكم سنة ١٢٢٢ مطابق شهر ربيع ١٩٠٥







90 90
135

Copy of a telegram No: 25 dated 3rd April 1905, from
His Majesty's Consul Busreh, to the British Ambassador,
Constantinople.

Reference your telegram dated 24th March. According
to information received here by letters, it appears that
the Mushir and Amir were at Khadra, and that 4 battalions
proceeded from Medina, and have arrived near Kassim.
Number of troops from Medina, is estimated at a battery
and three battalions by local military sources. The Amir's
Agent at Busreh, telegraphing to Reshid Pasha, Yildiz,
reports that the Arab robbers have been punished and sub-
dued by the Amir, and that it was expected that affairs
would soon be settled also, that there had arrived at
Koweit for the purpose of contriving mischief, a Nejd
friend of Sheikh Mobarek, accompanied by other bad men.

Confidential



No: 526 of 1905.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 16th April 1905.

Copy forwarded with compliments to Captain S.G. Knox
Political Agent Koweit for information.

By Order etc.,

Beeson Captain,
First Assistant Resident in the
Persian Gulf.





Confidential.

Forwarded with
Koweit letter
No 184 d/28.10.05
to Pol. Resalt.

File KXII
page

Appendix

91
136

Sheikh Inobark's
description of present
state of political
situation in ^{the} interior
of Arabia (October 1906).

1. Hail & the
Bui Rashid family.

Bui Rashid is not
strong even in Hail.

Hamood, uncle of the
present chief & brother
of Muhammad bin
Rashid holds charge
& the recent fighting
between the two factions
four of his sons have
been killed. These are
named as follows:—

Maid

Salim

Muhammad

Obeid.

Three sons remain to
him.




The eldest is Sultan ١٣١
who is at enmity with
the rest of his family
& lives at Jof. He has
recently been corresponding
with Sheikh Moarak.

The other two, Saood &
Taysul, are with their
father Hamood in Hail.

Abdul Aziz bin Mutabb
the chief of the Bin
Rashid family has not
resided at Hail for the
past six years but is
constantly wandering
in the desert.

The state of Hail (the
town) is deplorable. The
population now consists
merely of Bin Rashid's
soldiers, as all men of
substance the usual
inhabitants having no
means of livelihood



92
have dispersed to other towns, selling their household property to provide them with money for their journey.

2. State of R. Riadh.

Abdur Rahman bin Faysal, the head of the Bin Saood family, is at Riadh. The town & district are prosperous. There is no truth in the story of a rising at Sedeyr against Bin Saood's power.


Abdyl Aziz bin Fagood has arrived in Riyadh.

State of Al Kasim.

There are no Turkish soldiers nor representatives in R. Riadh.

3. State of Al Kasim.

Abdur Aziz bin Saood, the eldest son



of the chief & the man of
action in the family lies ¹³⁹
armed in Borezda.

There is a detachment
of 50 Turkish soldiers
in Borezda & ~~the~~
another of 30 in Anaza.
There are no civil representatives of Turkish power.

The main body are
at Sheykh, five hours
northwest of Borezda.

They number 600 with
eight guns but they are
constantly being withdrawn.
They originally numbered
7000. They are under the
orders of Feriz, Sadig
Pasha.

El Kasim is prosperous.
No Turkish customs
have been established

& gazavans come & go
^{between} from Koweit to Hejd
unmolested. A large
one was despatched
from Koweit to Hejd
five days ago.



When asked what ⁹³was
his opinion of the general
situation in the interior,
Sheikh Hobarak replied
that it was entirely
satisfactory from the
point of view of himself
& his friends of the
Bin Saood faction.

St. 28/10/5. If Khos Captain
P.O. Koweit

note. I wish to emphasize
the fact that some of the
assertions in the above
statement have been
verified. The description
of the Turkish troops
sounds improbable.


From another source,
not usually favorable to
Sheikh Hobarak, I hear
that Bin Saood's people
recently raided some
tribes supposed to be





well affected to
Bni Rashid. Inobarak
remonstrated with Bni
Saood on the subject,
pointed out the impolicy
of unprovoked aggression
& threatened to withdraw
his favour, if such
lawless proceedings continued.



If this story had been
brought me by an Arab, I
should at once have
dismissed it as concocted
for my benefit ^{by Bni Inobarak}, but the
position of my informant
is such that this solution
seems improbable.


PK.











(Copy)

CONFIDENTIAL.

No:4441-E.B.

From the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign Department.

To,

Major P.Z.Cox, C.I.E.,
Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf.

Dated Fort William, the 5th December 1905.

Sir,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No: 513, dated the 29th October 1905, requesting to be furnished with instructions as to the attitude you should adopt should Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman bin Saood endeavour to visit the Pirate Coast and Oman.


2. The Government, of India, while noting your views as to the improbability of the visit taking place, are of opinion that the matter is sufficiently serious to justify immediate action; and they are inclined to think that the best way of exercising pressure on bin Saood, with a view to preventing the visits, might be through the channel of the Sheikh of Koweit who controls, to a large extent, the supply of arms for Nejd which must still be a matter of importance to bin Saood.


3. The Political Agent at Koweit is, therefore, authorised, unless you see any objection, to make enquiries of Sheikh Mobarek as to the facts. A report should in that case be sent of the results of the interview.

4. Since the present rumour appears to be somewhat indefinite, care should be taken at the present stage not to give too official a character to any communication that may be made to Sheikh Mobarek.

I have etc.,

(sd) L. RUSSELL.





97

To P.R.

145

D. Camp Jahna

18/1/6.

Confidential


Camp no. 1.

Si,

I have the honour to ack:
the receipt of your confidential
letter no. 97 d. Bushire 17/1/6.
on the subject of Bni Saood's
projected visit to the
Pirate Coast & Oman.

2. This morning, I took
the opportunity of discussing
the matter with Sheikh
Muabarak on the lines
indicated at the close
of para. 2 of your letter
quoted above.

3. Sheikh Muabarak
informed me that he
had heard of Bni Saood's
plans which he regarded



as a mere attempt to extort
money from the various coastal
chiefs, that he had
written to Bui Saood
already pointing out to
him the impolicy of a
confession, on the part of
a ruler, to lack of funds,
& further reminding him
that Bui Rashid was only
scotched not-killed, that
Bui Saood's power in he'd
was anything but firmly
established, that he
had neither funds nor
transport for a policy
of aggression in the
direction of Oruan &
that the first fruits of
such an attempt would
be that Sheikh Inobarak
would break off relations
with him.

L. The Sheikh, in conclusion,



98
said that he did not ¹⁴⁷
suppose that, after this
letter, Bui Saood would
persist in his design,
though Sheikh Inobarak
would not undertake
to answer for the opinion
& policy of an ignorant
savage.



5. The Sheikh & I were
quite alone at this
interview & I have done
my best to render
accurately the substance
of his remarks. It would
appear that Sheikh Inobarak
by no means approves of
all Bui Saood's actions;
he complains that there
is a want of system &
organization
management in L Riadh
& that Bui Saood is not
the man to attain to
the position of his forefathers.
Recently, the Sheikh has



been constantly complaining ^{1/20}
to me of the degeneracy
of the Arabs & the utter
want of security & order
outside the limits of his
own territories but I
have been unable, so
far, to learn what ~~is~~
~~the~~ recent occurrences
have given rise to these
complaints

I have &c

SK



Transl
To P.R.

99 (100)

149

Cfl. no. 34. dt. 3/2/6.

Sir,

page 125

In continuation of comes ending with my Camp no. 1. D. 19th January on the subject of Bin Saood's projected visit to the Pirate Coast & Oman, I have the honour to inform you that Sh. Mobarak visited me yesterday morning & of his own accord introduced this topic of conversation & informed me that he had written to Bin Saood on the subject.

2. This recalled for return to the subject suggests to me that Sheikh Mobarak ~~has~~ good has strong objections to Bin Saood being served by



any port but Koweit & 15
that we may reckon on
Sheikh Moabarak's support
in this matter.


3. It has also occurred to
me that *Shauha*

Sh.

3. Sheikh Moabarak
again assured me that
he had every hope that the
visit would not come off &
that Bin Saood's only object
was money.

Shauha

Sh.





amused by such a proceeding
on the part of Bin Saood. ✓

He then introduced me
to Abdul Aziz bin Badar
& I told the latter to
come & see me which he
did on Monday morning.
I did not get much out
of him & am ashamed
to have to own that it
was mostly owing to the
extreme difficulty I found
in understanding him.
He got into complicated
Turkish law terms & used
mutilated foreign words
but I gathered that he
had dispatched 200
soldiers to Bussora
that in some few cases
he had to pay for redeeming
their weapons & did not
care to den the Turkish
Government for such a
trifle. The form his



101
punishment has taken 102
is very light & he owned
that all the hardship
that he suffered under
was ~~that~~ a certain
difficulty in transacting
business & looking after
his date gardens in
Bussorah & the necessity
of reporting his movements
to the Turkish authorities.
One might call it open
arrest.

He told me that a
previous Wali had
admitted that he was
a victim of oppression
& that his imprisonment
was inflicted with the
view of putting pressure
on the Sheikh of Koweit.

It seems to me that
Koweit treats me




154
better than ever. I have
made more acquaintances
& people are all very
civil & obliging. As I
am too modest to attribute
this to my own charms,
I keep wondering what
this lull before the
storm means. The
Turks have not even
taken the trouble to
protest.


Is there any chance
of seeing you at Koweit
& has anything more
been heard of the
Admiral & his visit to
the Gulf? I ask because
I am thinking of another
tour in March & April.


Could you please let me
know, if you have time,
what are the hopes for




"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٠٣و] (٣٨٦/٢٠٥)








١٥٣ / ١٥٦
ادعائهم بقائهم
عرف جنابكم من قبلها السباع فتعرف سلكهم اهل عمان اهل مكاسبنا
من يوم هنا بالهداية وصحيح روحنا لهم فطرتهم وما نسب لهم ما واهم ههنا
عن قصد ولا ذكرنا بها شئ من الامور التي نهى عنها خلق الله ان كان
شئ ما ارعينا به بالجل من لا عيب فيه ومن قبل ما نسب الي عند جنابكم
وابشهر تعرف سلكهم ان هنا ما صر بعض معرفتنا الى لقب
ولحجهم وانما في امر ما يوافق حق قضا عدلهم ما تفرقهم وانما
نسب لهم على ارادتهم ومنزلة ذلك من عرض فضا يلزم ترحيبهم به
بقائهم والله







that we are a little deficient
in our knowledge of titles
& how to answer them &
we fear (to write) something
that may not be suitable
to their rules. We do not
know them that we should
write to them according to
their desires & we expect
that from your kindness. We
hope from God that he will
prolong your existence and
Salvage.

L. B. I have not seen the
original but I have no
reason to suppose that this
is not genuine.

Yours sincerely
H. Knol



105
159
106

Note

on Conversation between the Resident
Busluie & Sheikh Mobarak of
Koweit.

On the 7th March 1906, at 4 p. m.
Sheikh Mobarak returned the
informal visit paid by the Resident
the previous day. The present
interview lasted about an hour & a
half & Sheikh Mobarak was as
friendly & cordial as usual.

1. Prospects of peace in the interior.
After the usual compliments &
enquiries, Sheikh Mobarak informed
the Resident that he thought that he
would be interested to hear that he
had lately on the 29th Zi-ul-Haj
= 24th February 1906. received a
letter from Bni Rashid, couched in
friendly terms & proposing that
Sheikh Mobarak should be on the
same terms with him as ^{the Rulers of Koweit had been} with his uncle
& grandfather before him.

The Sheikh said that he had
replied to Bni Rashid that he was



a man who loved peace & quietness & would welcome friendly relations with him, provided Bin Rashid would keep within his own boundaries & not harry his neighbours & was sincere in his desires for peace.

The Resident, in the way of friendly interest, asked how peace could be arranged between the two whether a meeting would be necessary or ^{trustful} ~~unfriendly~~ messengers would be sent.

The Sheikh replied that it would be done by correspondence & that a meeting would be unnecessary. He proceeded to sketch the terms, on which, in his opinion, a reconciliation between him & Bin Rashid could be considered practicable.

These were

- (1) that Bin Rashid should have Chhaffa & Hail & the Bedouins of Jebel Shammar.
- (2) that Bin Subah should have Koweit, Aneyza, Boreyda, Sedeir & Washum & control the tribes.
- (3) that Bin Saood should have Hejd & the Abadi Dowasir.



107 106
The Resident asked if Sheikh Inobarak thought that he would be able to keep the parties to their agreement ^{with himself & one another} & the Sheikh replied that he could.

The Resident asked whether, under such circumstances, Bni Rasheed would have sufficient income to enable him to live without harrying his neighbours & Sheikh Inobarak replied that he would have Hail & Lhaffa, the zikat of the Shammar & the produce of forays on the Harb & Aniza between Hail & Medina.

Asked what view the Turks would take of this triple alliance, Sheikh Inobarak replied that they would undoubtedly regard it with disfavour.

2. Relations between Us-Subah & Bni Saood.

The Resident then asked whether the relations between Sheikh Inobarak & Bni Saood were as formerly & Sheikh Inobarak replied that they were & that Bni Saood still listened to his advice.



١٥ The Resident here thanked the Sheikh for his cooperation in ascertaining the truth about Bin Saood's alleged intention to visit Oman. He rejoiced that H. H. Syud Feisal had also written to him & that he had told him that there was no cause for alarm & that Bin Saood had enough to do where he was.

A reference was made to the long telegram sent from Bushire to Constantinople through Jassin bin Thani on behalf of Bin Saood. Sheikh Inobarak was asked what inference he drew from the fact that Bin Saood had not consulted him before & regarding its despatch. The Sheikh said that he had received full details from Bin Saood's messenger, Musaad bin Sa'ud weisim, who sent that telegram but admitted that he had heard nothing from the Bin Saood family or from Abdur Rahman.



He thought this was because the ¹⁰⁷ telegram had been inspired by Jasin ¹⁶³ bin Thani of whom he spoke in no very favorable terms.

A.B. Other topics of the conversation have been placed in their respective files.


The headings are


Koweit flag.

Jasin bin Mubarak bin Khalifa

Yusef bin Brahmi.

J. B. A. S.





CONFIDENTIAL

No: 1308 of 1906.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 10th June 1906.

To,

The Political Agent,
KOWEIT.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that having heard that Abdul Aziz bin Saood has expressed his intention of visiting the Arab Coast, His Majesty's Government have decided that if (and when) he appears anywhere on the Coast, a man-of-war is to be despatched to warn him not to go to the Trucial or Oman Coast.

I accordingly request that you will be so good as to give me early intimation of Bin Saood's approach.

I have the honour to be


Sir,


Your most obedient servant,


Alcock Captain,
First Assistant Resident.

(In charge current duties).









Confidential.

No: 2776-E.B.

A copy of the foregoing communication is forwarded to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, for information in continuation of the endorsement from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No: 2567-E.B. dated 20th June 1906.

By Order etc.,

(sd). V. Gabriel.


Under Secy: to the Govt: of India.

Foreign Department,

S I M L A.

The 30th June 1906.

Despatch from Sir N. O'Connor to Sir Edward Grey, (No: 309-Secret and Confidential), dated 8th May 1906. (Received with letter from the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, London, No: 22, dated 1st June 1906.)





111 (112)
167

(Received on 18th June 1906, with Political Secretary's letter No: 22, dated 1st June 1906.

ARABIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(May 14th).

Section 1.

No: 1.

Sir M. O'Connor to Sir Edward Grey (Received May 14th).

(No: 309. Secret and Confidential).

Constantinople.
May 8th, 1906.

Sir,


With reference to my despatch No: 292 of the 1st instant, I learn from a secret and confidential source that the Vali of Busreh has informed the Vali of Baghdad, who has in turn reported to the Ottoman Government, that the armed conflict in Kassim between Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saood, which resulted in the death of the former and the defeat of his followers, was the result of the attempts of Sheikh Mobarek-us-Subah, of Koweit, to bring about a reconciliation between these two Arab Chiefs. The Vali of Busreh accused Mobarek of plotting and treachery, and asked that the necessary military steps might be taken at once to restore order and arrest Ibn Saood.

In a telegram sent by the Grand Vazier to the Vali of Baghdad in reply to this message, the opinion is expressed that the position of affairs in Kassim and the neighbouring districts, brought about by the death of Ibn Rashid, is the direct outcome of the recent encroachments of the military authorities in the province on the functions of the civil authorities. The Vali is to warn the Commander of the VI Army Corps that all interference in civil matters must now cease, and that no time must be lost in taking steps to restore tranquility in the disturbed districts.

I have etc.,

(sd) N.R. O'Connor.








169

anything of interest you
may hear regarding
Bin Saud's doings and
movements.

Hoping you are well.
Yours sincerely,

Note.

In reply to this, all items
of Reid news for August were
passed on to Consul Bassa & orders
have since been recd from Presbiter
to supply Consul regularly with
Reid news v. Diary file
20/9/16 JH



Copy.

Very Confidential

Sharada
July. 7. 1900.

Sir, with ref: & my deep: interest
recd. of the 21st ult. I have to
inform you that this day (Sunday)
as per date, writing on the 19th ult.,
reports the arrival in this city of
news to the effect that the Lord
has lately ordered all the Arab
Shiites and tribes in Iraq to
desist from keeping communication
with the Turkish officials and troops
and to stop carrying their mail
and

Yours truly,
Hassan



171
and supplies under threat of
severe punishment. of his orders
were not complied with.

The Sheikh of tribes who were
then helping the Turks in
Iraq had informed the military
officers, who are with the Turkish
troops that this was their
intention to do with them in
Iraq and that they were not
carry their mail and supplies.

This information was sent by
the officer commanding the Turkish
troops in Iraq to Baghdad, where
it was telegraphed to London.
The Sup. Ottoman Gov. has
ordered.



114
115
172
ordered the military Amalissari,
who is still in Medina, to march
with 600 horses and 2 guns to the
help of the Turkish troops now
in Egypt and to take the necessary
steps to keep the lines of com-
munication open.

It is also reported in Jeddah
that the son of the Rashid has
gone over to attack the Saudis
and has asked the Turkish
troops to cooperate with him.

I should be glad if you would
make careful enquiries with a
view to following as closely as
possible the condition of affairs in
Central Arabia and that you will
report to me any news you may
be.



173

be able to obtain, which confirm
the information supplied by
acting Consul Sheikh Ibrahim
Musri.

I am &c.
(10) H. P. O. (cont.)

to. Basra, Aug. 11. 1906.
Forwarded to the Political Agent at
Koriss with the compliments of
the undersigned, and a request
that he will be good enough to
keep him informed of any news
received at Koriss tending to
confirm the report contained in
this despatch.

Jayson.
H. P. O.



To P. R. ^{(116) 115}

174

No 313.

Df. 28/8/6.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that, at an interview that I had today with Sheikh Nadhan he referred to the letter that Abdul Rahman bin Fajal bin Saud wrote in the year before last to your address & to the letter that reached me shortly after my arrival here & seemed anxious again to persuade me that it would be to the advantage of the English to take Bin Saud under protection.

page 10




2. One of the arguments he used was that with hejd in security & Bin Saud under English protection, a caravan would start daily from Koweit for the interior & all its loads would be of Indian merchandise. He also said that hejd contained, with the tribes, three millions of men.


3. It is perhaps hardly necessary to state clearly that Bin Saud & ^{probably} ~~possibly~~ Hobarak himself are uneasy about the late activity of the Turks in El Kasim. Sheikh Hobarak declares now that the Turkish soldiers in hejd are still 3000 men.


I have &

SK.

* In reply I said to Sheikh Hobarak that he might rest assured that I would report this conversation to you.







S 1933-2,000-3-06

No. 2140 of 1906 .

Confidential.

BRITISH RESIDENCY AND CONSULATE-GENERAL:

Bushire, 15th September 1906 .

To

THE POLITICAL AGENT,
KOWEIT.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith for
your information copy of a despatch addressed by H. B.
* No: 62 dated 31st August 1906. [M's Consul at Busreh
to H. B. M's Ambassador at Constantinople.

2. With reference to Mr. Crow's statement as to the
channels through which Ibn Saood and Meta'ab "bin
Rashid" respectively receive their allowances, I would
request the favour of being furnished with such further
information as you may be able to obtain both on this
point and as to the nature and amount of the payments
made.

I have the honour to be


Sir,


Your most obedient servant,

P. 2. Cox

Major,


Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.





11A 118
178
: 62

Sudqi Pasha ^{said} that Ibn Saood was jealous of Saleh bin Mohanna's intercourse with the Turkish Officers and that he got the people of Boreyda to sign a mazbata complaining of his oppression and then removed him to Riyadh. He attributes his removal to personal animosity. Though Mohanna







120 119 179
Mohanna was appointed Caimakan of Boreyda by the Mushir, the appointment had not been confirmed by Constantinople.

Sudqi Pasha marched from Boreyda to Zilfi and thence travelled by way of Es Safa and Subakeya to Koweit crossing the northern end of the Dahna between Koweit and Kasim. From Zilfi onwards he found water once every four days. The journey was performed on camels. He brought 142 men with him and had no casualties. He seems to have travelled very quickly. He told me that peace had been established between Ibn Saood and Ibn Rashid but did not think it would last very long. He described Ibn Saood as a desert diplomatist and the late Abdul Aziz Bin Rashid as a desert warrior and said the former displayed considerable ability and adriotness in his dealings while the latter was a fighting man pure and simple. Meta'ab his son is only 21 and Sudqi Pasha thinks his youth will prevent him from taking any active line for the present, but his ambition to make a name for himself and follow in his father's footsteps may lead to a recurrence of hostilities between the rival factions at no distant date. He stated the Arabs had now all retired to their homes and their pastures.

The murder of Abdul Aziz bin Jilwa while on his way to Koweit with letters from Ibn Saood was I am informed perpetrated by a raiding party of Shammar Arabs who had not heard the news of peace being proclaimed.

I learn that the allowance granted by the Turkish Government to Ibn Saood is by recent arrangement paid through the Sheikh of Koweit, who deducts it from the land tax due to the Government on his Fao property. Meta'ab's allowance is supposed to be paid through Baghdad but I have not heard of his receiving anything as yet.

I can obtain no confirmation of the report from Jeddah mentioned in Your Excellency's despatch of 7th July that Ibn Saood had ordered the Arab Sheikhs and tribes in Nejd to abstain from communication with Turkish officers





(21) 120 180
officers and troops and to stop carrying their mails and supplies. Sudqi Pasha seems to have been on very friendly terms with Ibn Saood who visited him several times during his recent visit to Boreyda and brought his retainers and many Arab Sheikhs with him. The troops have no doubt suffered from want of money and though there was little or no fighting they must necessarily have endured great hardships.

(sd). F.E. CROW.

No:12.


Copy forwarded to His Majesty's Resident and Consul-General with the compliments of the undersigned.


(sd). F.E. CROW.

H.M.'s Consul.

Basra.


6th September 1906.







"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٢٢ظ] (٣٨٦/٢٤٤)





122 (23)
182

No: 2/81 of 1906.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 16 September 1906.

From

Major P. E. Cox, C.I.E.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

To

Sir Louis Dane, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,
Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign Department,
S I M L A.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward, for the consideration of Government, a copy of the communication originally quoted, which I
Political Agent, Koweit, to Resident. No: 313 dated 28th August 1906. have received from the
Political Agent at Koweit, on the subject of the aspirations of Bin Saood to enter into closer relations with the British Government.


2. In the same connection I have the honour to refer to paragraph 2 of my letter No: 54 of 23rd February last to your address.


Subsequently when touring on the Arab Coast in May last I had an opportunity of meeting Sheikh Jasim bin Thani at his summer quarters at Lusail and on that occasion he expressed himself to much the same effect on behalf of Bin Saood, saying that the latter was now strong enough to drive the Turks out of Nejd and Al Hassa and asking whether in the event of his coming down to the Coast, the British Government could not see their way to give him the same measure of protection by sea as they gave to Sheikh Mobarek and other Arab Chiefs on the Coast,

in



"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [٢٣١ظ] (٢٤٦/٣٨٦)





in pursuance of their traditional policy of preserving the maritime peace of the Gulf. He added that it would be a simple matter for Bin Saood to meet a British Officer at the Coast if that course were considered desirable. 183

In reply I told Sheikh Jasim that this was a question to which I could not give him any definite answer offhand and without instructions from the Government of India.

Just at that time the news of the death of Bin Rashid at the hands of his rival reached the coast and the situation seemed so kaleidoscopic that I delayed making any report to Government until matters had crystallised somewhat.


I have now received from Captain Knox a communication from Sheikh Mobarek to much the same effect as the foregoing. We have thus been approached from three directions and I think there can be no doubt that these representations may be held to have been inspired by Bin Saood personally.

3. Bin Rashid's death at the hands of his rival had an important influence on the situation and as the Government of India have been informed the three-cornered peace of which the possibility was indicated in paragraph 2 of my letter No: 620 of 18th March has lately taken shape.

Whether it will endure on its own merits or whether the Turks will at once set themselves to undo it, it is impossible to prophesy, but seeing that the present Bin Rashid is a mere youth of 18, it is hardly likely that he will be able to make any serious stand against Bin Saood for some time to come. The juncture is consequently a convenient one for an examination and review of the political situation in Central Arabia and of our attitude towards Bin Saood and I venture to hope that Government will take advantage of it for that purpose.

4. While I believe I am right in thinking that His Majesty's Government regard with no favour the idea of

the







the Turks establishing themselves in Nejd; I am at the same time aware that it has been a recognised principle of their policy not to allow themselves to become involved in the tempestuous politics of Central Arabia. Nevertheless it must be conceded that we have principles and interests to consider other than the pursuit of the purely negative doctrine of aloofness above mentioned and I cannot see that these are in any way served by our carrying that doctrine to an extreme point and by our treating the predominant Arab element in Nejd with an active neglect which not only places us in an unnecessarily unfavourable position for safeguarding the other interests referred to but which if persevered in may be mistaken for hostility on our part and may engender a reciprocation of that sentiment on the part of the Wahabi Chief.

5. Thus it will be remembered that Bin Saood formally appealed to us for protection in a letter to me dated 2nd May 1904, but no reply on behalf of Government to that communication was ever authorised, and at the present time no practical modus vivendi between the Arab and ourselves can be said to exist.

The inconvenience of this became apparent in connection with the intention attributed to Bin Saood of visiting Oman, which has created so much apprehension in the minds of the Pirate Coast Chiefs during the past year. Had they known that any sort of friendly understanding existed between the Residency or Government and Bin Saood, both the Sultan of Muscat and the Trucial Chiefs would have been fortified with the consequent knowledge that any attempt on the part of the Wahabi to make a descent upon Oman would involve a preliminary rupture with us. In the absence of any such entente all we could do was to get Sheikh Mobarek to give him a hint that any such action on his part would be regarded with disfavour with us. It is true






126 125
185
true that it appeared afterwards that His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople^{had} expressed the opinion that we should deal with vide correspondence received with Foreign Department Endorsement No: 2020-B.R. dated 17th May 1906. Bin Saood direct, but meanwhile it had become necessary to take action locally in the most expeditious way open to us. As a matter of fact this course met with a very courteous response for Resident to Foreign Department No: 773 dated 5th April 1906. from Bin Saood as reported to Government at the time.

6. Another matter in regard to which we lose by not being on any sort of terms with the Wahabi is the question of piracy in the northern part of the Gulf. There is good reason to suppose that had we friendly relations with him, Bin Saood would be able to give us considerable assistance in running down notoriety like the outlaw Ahmed bin Salman who yearly commits more or less serious depredations during the pearling season.

7. At the present epoch^{as} before mentioned, peace reigns in the land and if we have any intention of establishing some measure of friendly intercourse with the Ruler of Nejd, the present seems to be the time for us to do so. If on the other hand we persevere in our policy of ignoring him altogether and leaving his appeals unanswered and if we allow the Turks to revive the strife in Central Arabia, which theoretically they have now no excuse for doing, it will be small matter for wonder if we make him our bitter enemy for the future.

I hesitate to make premature suggestions as to the terms which might figure in any agreement made as I am aware that the problem is a delicate one and requires examination by a lens of longer focus than I can command, but I think I may say without temerity that I should welcome any degree of friendly understanding which would facilitate my dealings with the Trucial Chiefs and which would





(127) 126
186

would render it possible and unobjectionable for our officers to make occasional tours in the country and thereby to acquire accurate information regarding the topography tribes and tribal politics of the interior, in respect of which our present store of knowledge is very meagre.

In these latter connections I solicit reference to the following items of previous correspondence;

(i). The latter part of Letter No: 69 dated 26th March 1904 from the Government of India to the Secretary of State, ~~for Foreign Affairs~~

(ii). Despatch from Sir Nicolas O'Connor to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, No: 189 dated 20th March 1906 in which His Excellency advocated the arrangement of a meeting between Bin Saood and a British representative on one of our Government Ships at some convenient point on the Coast. If this could take place, we should at all events know first hand what were the Arab's ambitions and what undertakings he was prepared to give in regard to matters which concerned us.

In any case I trust that I may be placed in a position to give an authoritative reply to the enquiries of Sheikh Jasim and Sheikh Mobarek for the information of their ally.


I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(sd) P. Z. Cox. Major,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.





Koweit ^{(128) 127}
Persian Gulf.
26/9/6.

My dear Major

The following news
has reached me with
reference to the situation
in Hejd & seems to me
to have its own significance

My dear Crow.

I have just sent the
following news to the
Resident but kept it
out of my diary. It
seems to me significant.

"The Turkish authorities
are said to have addressed
a letter to Mustafa bin
Rashid enquiring why
he made peace with
Abdul Aziz bin Saud &



informing him that
he had no authority
to do so. 188

The Farig, who passed
through Koweit the other
day is said to have
addressed the people
of El Kasim in the
following terms: —


"I don't wish to offer
you advice & I admit
that the soldiers we have
here are not sufficient
to take El Kasim & that
you are more numerous
& as well armed as we
are. But, if 500 of us
are killed & we kill 200
of you, we can replace
our 500 but where will
you replace your 200?
Heid is like a bit of
string, whereas the
Turkish Govt. is like a
bit of elastic & the




128
(121) 189
Punkish Govt. must
have El Kasim. Would
it not be as well for
you to put up with the
light burden it is now
sought to impose upon
you, rather than go
through the process I
have described? "

From the way this story
was told I came into
the conversation, I do
not think it was
concocted for my
benefit.

Yours sincerely
J. M. K.







them / to send an early
reply - he may rest as-
-sured that I will not
overlook it - Richard


Yours truly
P. Wilson

Informed Sheikh Hobani
with reference to above at
interview of this morning

28/9/6.
Informed P. R. by R
D/C. 28/9/6 R




"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٣١و] (٣٨٦/٢٦١)





"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٣١ظ] (٣٨٦/٢٦٢)





From Capt Keene

192
To Maj'r Cox C.P.E.
P.R. Musline

381
Confidential No. 4/ Koweit
30/9/6.

Sir,

I have the h: to ack.
the receipt of your no: 2/44
df. 15th Sep. 1906 on the
subject of the allowances
paid to Abu Saood &
Abu Rasheed by the
Turkish Govt.

2. In reply I have the
h: to inform you that
Sheikh Hobarakunform
me that the allowances
are fixed as follows.

In Abdul Rahman
bin Feyzul bin Saood



T£ 0 per mensem. 193
In hetaab-bri Rashid
200 tigers of ice per
annum
& T£ 200 per mensem.
In addition to the above
hetaab's predecessors
used to receive presents
of arms & ammunition
3. Sheikh Mobarak
says that the allowances
to Bri Rashid are paid
through the Baghdad
authorities
& that Yusuf Pasha
bri Maadil, a Basra
merchant draws the
Saood allowances from
the Basra authorities
& remits them by
cheque to Abdulla
hafisi, a Koweit
shopkeeper, who hands



132. 63
194
the money to Bin
Saud's emissaries.
At the same time
enquiries I have made
in another direction confirm
H. B. M. Consul's statement
that the allowances are
paid through Sheikh
Khalid in the way
indicated but at the
same time my informant
said that there was no
regular channel & that
the payments were made
in whatever manner
was most convenient.

Thos. B.

Thos.

5. While I was discussing
this matter with Sheikh
Khalid, he suddenly
turned to me & said "You
have been asking me about
Bin Rashid's & Bin Saud's
pay but you don't ask me




any questions about my ¹⁹¹⁵
pay? ". I said "Surely
you don't draw any pay?"
He replied "no! I do not,
but the Turkish authorities
at Biser are for ever
pressing me to accept it.
Instead of that, I pay
them & when they ask me
for £100, I send them
£100.. I told them in
reply to their insistence
that the receipt of pay
from the Turkish Govt had
ceased to be a source of
honour & had therefore
no longer any attraction
for me & that, thanks
be to God! I had plenty
of money."

I have &c
SK



"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٣٤و] (٣٨٦/٢٦٧)



No: 2405 of 1906.

British Residency and Consulate-General,

Bushire, 13th October 1906.

Copy forwarded to the Political Agent, Koweit,
for information with the compliments of the undersigned.

By Order,


J. Burdewood

Lieutenant,

Special Assistant to the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf.

Letter No: 805 dated 29th September 1906, from the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, Baghdad, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, with enclosure.

below
page 197






134 (135)
197

Copy of a letter No: 805 dated 29th September 1906, from Major J. Ramsay, C.I.E., Offg: Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and Acting British Consul-General, Baghdad, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, Khuzistan etc., Bushire.

With reference to your letter No: 2139 dated the 15th September 1906, I have the honour to enclose herewith a note by Mr. Gaskin on Nejd Affairs.

I am sending copies of this note to H.B.M's Ambassador at Constantinople, to the Government of India and to H.B.M's Consul at Busreh.

below
page 193





135
198
196

Memorandum of information obtained by Mr. Gaskin.

*
See my
note at
end.


With reference to the Turkish occupation, he informed me that there were only about 50 Turkish soldiers under a Kulaghazy at Boreida and a similar detachment at 'Aneza, and the main body, consisting of over a thousand Infantry, a few Cavalry with 4 heavy field guns and 5 or 6 lighter pieces, stationed at Sheihiya a village about 5 or 6 hours ride W.N.W. of Boreida, under the command of Sami Pasha.

The Turks are there on sufferance, and do not interfere in any way with the local affairs, and confine themselves to their quarters, only leaving them when going to purchase food or going to the Mosque for prayers.

The troops are stationed by their own Government. The Amir does not provide them with anything. They are wretchedly off. Many of the officers and men are continually deserting. If no fresh troops are sent to relieve the present garrison before long no soldiers will be left in Kassim through the wastage by disease and desertions.

As regards the young Amir, he stated that the people of Jabal Shammar are very hopeful of him, and he has gained their affection through his straightforwardness, generosity and the habit of carrying out no undertaking without consulting all the elders of the Al-Rashid clan and listening to the best advice. He has remitted the tribal taxes for the current year and reinstituted the payment of annual allowances to the various tribal chiefs, retainers and charities on the same scale as that paid by his grandfather. These allowances had been reduced by his father.

After reducing to obedience the Hetein and Khararat tribes occupying the tract of country lying between





(137) 136


199

between Teima and Jowf, the Amir on about the last week of August 1906 attacked the Mateir Arabs, adherents of Bin Saood in Kassim and carried away much plunder in the shape of camels, horses, cattle and Sheep.

Regarding the general feeling of the Arabs towards the Turks, my informant declared that there is a growing discontent and dislike towards them because of their unjust demands and harsh treatment, the life of the Arabs is becoming harder every year, and poverty is overshadowing them. Many of the Arab Chiefs whose incomes amount to 400 or 500 Liras which would be sufficient under ordinary conditions for their needs, are reduced to beggary on account of the exactions of the Turkish officials. The Arabs are longing to throw off the Turks and become independent or to come under the protection of the Great Powers as in the case of Bulgaria and Roumelia. With this view recently a Hiteim Chief whose brother is imprisoned by the Turks and not yet released, though the amount of bribes demanded by the officials have been paid, has proposed to the Sheikh of the Muntafik Arabs the formation of a strong confederacy of all the tribes for the purpose of turning ~~out~~ the Turks out of Arabia and applying subsequently to the Great Powers for protection. The Muntafik Sheikh did not fall in with the views of the Hiteim Sheikh as the Arabs consider the Hiteim are of inferior blood and a proposal coming from such a source would not be taken up by other Arabs.

Note. This has not been paraphrased, but is what the Arab said.

My informant also informed me that cereals are very expensive in Jabal Shammar and Kassim, and prices ranged five or six times as high as those on the Euphrates owing to the limited produce available in the regions mentioned. He explained that the fields are irrigated by water drawn from wells by camels, and these animals cannot stand the work, and in two months






137
200

months they become useless and are sold for a fifth of their original price and though there is plenty of water and arable land, for this reason they find it just as cheap to import their grain from the districts on the Euphrates. He has heard of the recent importations of pumps into Baghdad for purposes of irrigation and he is very much interested in the matter as he thinks that these appliances would meet with much favour in the regions indicated as the whole of the cultivable land may be brought under cultivation by their employment. He understands that the price of Russian Kerosine Oil necessary for working the oil-engine which drives the pump is about 20% dearer in Jabal Shammar than at Koweit from where it will have to be procured, and that proper mechanics will have to be engaged to work the engines etc. from Baghdad at a higher rate of pay than they receive locally. He wishes to procure definite information as regards a pumping plant capable of raising a similar quantity of water as 10 or 11 Bakras from a depth of 8 to 9 metres. When the details are forthcoming he proposes to transmit them to the Amir of Jabal Shammar and suggest to him the purchase of such a pumping plant for erection at Hayil as a trial. If the venture meets with success he declares that over 200 plants will be required in the localities mentioned alone. He asks me whether I would assist him in obtaining the details of a suitable plant - a plant that can be carried in pieces weighing from 2 to 2½ cwts each for transport by camel.

*
Water bags
drawn by
bullocks
known in India
as "char^{sa}".

In respect of the appearance of several sections of the Aneza tribe on the Euphrates between Musayib and Nejef he stated that it was nothing unusual. He explained that it was customary for these Arabs to camp in that neighbourhood during this season of the year so long as the grazing round-about supported their camels, cattle and flocks. About 15 years ago
the





(139) 138
201

the Aneza fell out with the Amir of Jabal Shammar and to avoid being raided by the Amir they kept aloof from the lower reaches of the Euphrates, but now that they have come to an understanding with the Amir, they need no longer take that precaution. There are several thousands of tents scattered in groups of 300 to 500 throughout the region mentioned.

(sd). J.G. Gaskin.

24th September 1906.


Note by Major Ramsay.

Mr. Gaskin's informant is in a position to have the latest and most accurate information of what is going on in the Ibn Rashid camp and counsels. The interview took place in the house of an Indian resident of Baghdad. I did not take part in it as my movements are carefully watched.

Mut'ib Ibn Rashid is said to have received an order on the Karbala district for £ T 250 a month. This is not regularly paid and the local officials are trying to get a bribe to induce them to pay; this Mut'ib has refused to pay. From another source I hear that the Sultan's Aide-de-Camp, who went to take a decoration to Mut'ib had got as far as Hayil.

(sd). J. Ramsay, Major.

29th September 1906.





From ¹³⁹
Major J. J. Knox
P.O. Koweit-
To Major P. L. Cox C.D.E.
Resident & H. B. his
Consul General in
the Persian Gulf
Bouche.
Gl No. 57. D. Koweit.
20/11/6.

Sir,
I have the honour to
inform you that I have
just returned this morning
from a visit to Sheikh
Mubarak at which he
gave me the following
news from Hejd.

2. He said that he had
received letters from
Bai Saud & from Bai Rashid
& that the former had told
him that the Mulassarif
with 1200 men & 12 guns
(Syrian troops) had left
for Medina on the 15th
Rauzan - approx. 3rd Nov?
& that on the 1st day of



^{= 1915 Nov}
Shawal, the Amin ul
Alai (or Commandant) 203
with 11000 Iraq troops &
3 guns would return to
Bussorah.

3. Bni Saud also said that
the Turkish authorities were
very anxious to leave 200
men in El Kasim of whom
100 should remain in
Boraida & 100 in Anaiza.
To this however he & the
headmen of El Kasim
refused to consent &
eventually it was agreed
that small detachments
only should remain 25 men
in Boraida & 15 men
in Anaiza.

4. Bni Saud also says
that he holds a paper
signed by 80 ^{officers} ~~men~~ of
~~standing~~ among the
Turkish troops to say
that they have found
Bni Saud a loyal servant



H.S. 2
of the Sultan, who has ¹⁴⁰ helped them to all they ²⁰⁴ needed as far as possible, that Hej'd is a poor country with an abominable ^{with water & no supplies} climate, which cannot support Turkish troops.

5. Sheikh Inobarate ended this lengthy recital with comments on the affairs of El Hassa which he said were in a very bad way & suggested that it would be an excellent thing if Bin Saud were to take El Hassa & Katif, his ancestral property (sic) & that he would then apply for the official protection of H. H.'s Government.

6. To this I replied that I could make, on this proposal, no comment whatever



but that, as the Sheikh²⁰⁵
probably was perfectly
well aware, all
communications that
he made to me were
promptly passed on to
you for transmission
to higher authority who
would send such instructions
to me as they thought
fit & that it was idle
for me to speculate as
to what view they would
take of it.

7. The Sheikh then
mentioned that a
large number of
people at Kerbela
had applied to ~~the~~
H.B. his Consul General
at Bagdad for protection
& that the ^{district} country ^{round} around Amara
between the two.
walazats of Bagdad &



Besra was full of ¹⁴¹2006
revolt & that the rail-
way would never reach
the sea or be prosperous
unless it was in the
hands of the English
from Bagdad to the sea
& that the Sultan could
draw the profit of it. He

He said that the Germans
had been playing with
the Porte & remarked
that it was England &
her warships who had
saved Constantinople
at the close of the last
Russo-Turkish war.

8. The Sheikh told
me that he had no
exact information as
to the Turkish casualties
in U Hassa but that
the Afrikan declared



that they had destroyed
two troops & taken away
طابو
their arms & that more
than half the garrison
had been killed. He
said that undoubtedly
Fahād bin Hithlayn,
the Agriani chief, now
in Kuwait, had captured
a gun & brought in two
mules & many donkeys
for sale ^{in Kuwait} & would send in
more

G. Fahād bin Hithlayn
came to see me on the
19th instant & with him
an old & influential
sheikh
chief of the Agriani
named Salim ibn
Muhammad of the
al-Hadi section. The
chief is a ^{fine handsome} young man
of about 30 years of age.
He looked lazy &
goodnatured & talked



but little but he ^{gave} ^{that} ¹⁴²
one the impression of being
he would be a leader of men,
fierce & vindictive, if he
was roused to action. 208
10. These two both
exaggerated Sheikh
Mubarak's account of
their victory & said
that the Hassa townsmen
with the soldiers had
now tasted their vengeance
& were ready to agree to
any terms. They had
offered to write off all
the account of bloodshed
& to pay up all arrears
of ~~for~~ allowances due
to the Qatari Sheikh
& especially sued that
they might ^{repay} ~~bring~~ ^{back} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~fun~~ ^{fun} (offering 2000
~~dollars~~ for it) & the mules
captured. Fahad
refused to ~~sell~~ sell
the fun, saying that he
would send it either to
~~was going to consult~~
Mubarak or Bni Saud.




209
Sheikh Inbarak about
that. They offered me a
warm welcome if I
came to their country
which ^{begins} ~~is~~ about ~~two~~ ^{three} days
south of Kuwait.

11. The Turkish withdrawal
from Hejd, coupled with
the news from El Hassa, appears to
have had a very unfortunate
effect ~~for~~ ^{on} them on public
opinion in these parts
& it one might ~~venture~~
hazard the ~~prediction~~ ^{assertion}
that Sheikh Inbarak
knows more than he
told me about possible
risings in El Hassa &
the Muntafiah country.


I have &c

SR.






"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٤٤٤ظ] (٣٨٦/٢٨٨)






"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٤٥] (٣٨٩/٢٨٩)







"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٤٥ ظ] (٣٨٦/٢٩٠)





Ahway Dec 5. 1886.

Dear Sir, I am doing a short tour in
the part of the world on behalf of
the I.B. Souda and find that one
of the subjects on which they desire
me to report is "High affairs - Relations
between the Sheikh of Kuwait and the
two mail parcels in 'Hajd' by those
of Bin Rashid & Bin Saoud" -
My boat stopped at Kuwait on its way
to Basra but the hour of arrival seemed
such an inconvenient one for calling
upon you that I decided not to do so -
Owing to the time at my disposal being short



21/2


There seems little chance of my
being able to stop at Kuwait on
my return journey, I am however
writing to ask if you could give me any
notes on this above subject. Sent
when c/o the Consul Ashkumrah
or c/o the Consul Basra I
could pick them up when I pass
those places about the 2nd week of
February and I should be very
grateful for anything you could do.




۲۹۳



"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٤٧ظ] (٣٨٦/٢٩٤)





Camp near Umm
23/12/6. 214


Dear Sir,

Your letter of the 5th only reached me yesterday & finds me in camp. It is a little difficult to put promptly into concise form such a complicated subject as the relation between the Sheikh of Kuwait & the two rival parties in here.

Again, our local politics are so kaleidoscopic that what is true today will be quite false a month hence. With these reservations, I will put the matter as shortly as I can.


In the spring of 06, Abdul Aziz bin Saud terminated a series of successful operations by surprising Abdul Aziz bin Rashid at night & killing him with the bulk of his following. The Amirship of Hail thus descended on Mish'ab son of Abdul Aziz, a lad of 15. Naturally, the Bin Rashid family have lost a good deal in prestige but it would be a mistake to suppose that their power has been completely destroyed.

The Turks have made an abortive




attempt to establish their power in El
Kasim. The troops sent to effect this
object suffered great privations & have
just been withdrawn. Only the day
before yesterday, the Bagdad contingent
passed within a few miles of my
encampment on their way to Iraq &
another large body left before them
en route to Medina. As far as can be
ascertained, less than 100 Turkish soldiers
now remain in Central Arabia. They are
posted in Anaisa & Boraida & are not
permitted to interfere with the administration
which remains in the hands of local
headmen who possibly enjoy a Turkish
title but in reality fear Bin Saud &
good deal more than they do the Sublime
Porte.

From the above it will be clear that
Bin Saud is the ruler in Central
Arabia. With the benevolent supervision
of Sheikh Moabarak, a truce has been
hatched up between Bin Saud & Bin
Rashid but causes of quarrel between
all three will not be wanting & it will
be a matter for surprise & congratulation
if the truce should last any time. The
tribes will continue to raid on each other
as they have always done.



In conclusion, may I venture to suggest¹⁵⁰ that, if the Intelligence Branch wishes²¹⁶ to keep posted in Central Arabian affairs, their best plan, short of personal investigation on the spot which would be both costly & difficult, would be to consult the files of the F. O. at Simla, where the diaries of the Persian Gulf give at least as good a description as can be found anywhere of the ever changing politics of that troubled Country.

By the way, I enjoy no consular status in Koweit. My proper title is Political Agent. You will, I feel sure, believe me when I say that I have no personal interest in such a question but the distinction is of some importance politically & it might give rise to some misunderstanding if I was styled vice consul or consul in official documents, even though confidential. I have been sent to Koweit under the orders of the Government of India & no permission has been sought from






Turkey²⁴⁷ or from the Sheikh of Koweit,
though it is true that the latter has
stated from time to time that he would
appreciate, as a favour, the presence
of a British agent at his port.

I was extremely sorry to miss the
pleasure of a visit from you at
Koweit & when your cards reached
me, if the wind had not been contrary,
I should have sent my boat back
again for you.

Yours sincerely

A. J. A. J.









219
A fight up between Bin Rashid & Bin Saood.

4. The three sons referred to as Sultan, who has now assumed the title of Amir, & Saood & Fayez.

Apparently it was Sultan who is responsible for the murder of the young sons of the late Amir Abdul Aziz. The story as given in Kuwait, goes that the young boys were out hawking & Sultan came out & joined them after consulting his father, Haunood who endeavoured in vain to dissuade him from his design. He left a slave with the two young boys with instructions to kill them as soon as he heard a shot fired. He himself rode out with khat'ab who had no suspicion of the crime intended & was easily shot by the traitor from behind. The two little boys were then murdered by the slave. It is surmised in Kuwait that Sultan had some previous understanding with Bin Saood.

5. The Sheikh is of the opinion that all this tends to strengthen Bin Saood's position & he says that the latter will probably now take Heir. He has told me that he recently met the Wali of Basra who was very much afraid that Bin Saood would soon be the English. Robaiah says that he reassured him that the English do not want Heir. The Sheikh says too that it is interesting to see the change of tone in the correspondence of the Turkish authorities with Bin Saood. At first they hardly replied to his letters & now they are excessively civil to him.







(152) 153

221

Confidential

Extract from Persian Gulf Political Residency
Diary for the week ending 20th January 1907.

Item No: 107.

As regards Nejd Affairs, it is rumoured in
Bahrein that the Wali of Bassorah has invited
Amir Abdur Rahman bin Saood to meet him at
Safwan (صفوان) where Sheikh Mubarek bin
Sabah will also be present.

No: 169 of 1907.

British Residency and Consulate-General,

Bushire, 22nd January 1907.

Forwarded with compliments to the Political
Agent, Koweit, for information, and favour of
communication of any information which may reach
him on the subject.

By Order,

H. B. Wood

Lieutenant,

Special Assistant to the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf.



222

To P.R.

Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge
the receipt of your office memo.
no: 169 of 22/1/7. on the subject
of the alleged visit of Abdul Rahman
bin Feyzul bin Sa'ood to Sefwan
to meet H. E. the Wali of Basra.


In reply I have the honor
to inform you that I yesterday
asked Sheikh Inbarak if there
was any truth in the rumour

& he told me that the Turkish
authorities would be glad to have
Bin Sa'ood visit Sefwan but
that there was not the smallest
likelihood of his proceeding
thither

I have &c

S. K. Noor

D. Koweit
17/3/07




Jan. 14. 1866.


Dear Sir, Very many thanks for
your letter which reached me
yesterday - I am exceedingly
obliged to you for the trouble you
have taken in writing it, and feel
sure that it will give the I. B. all
the information they can desire - I
will suggest to them as you say that
in future they had better consult




224
OCT 28 1900
the Gulf diaries for this sort of
information - I must apologise
for the incorrect address I put
in your letter - I was writing in
a hurry or should not have
made the mistake - With again
many thanks I remain
Yours truly
Walter Baird



"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٥٤و] (٣٨٦/٣٠٧)







Confidential . No. 169. of 1907.

155 156
225

Political Agency, Koweit . D/4 Koweit 15th April 1907.

To
Major P.Z.Cox C.I.B.
Resident & H.B.M.'s Consul-General in the
Persian Gulf , Bushire.

Sir ,


I have the honour to ~~inform you~~ place on record the fact that, on two occasions, during the visit of H.E the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Sheikh Mobarak brought to your notice that Sultan bin Rashid, the present de facto Amir of Hail, had written to Sheikh Mobarak and asked him to bring him (Sultan) under the protection of the British Government .

2. On the second occasion, when Sir George Warrender visited Sheikh Mobarak at Sirra on the 14th instant, letters , purporting to come from Sultan , were shewn to me . The writer said that his letter was secret & that he had heard that pay & allowances had been granted to Abdur Rahman bin Saud and that he had applied to the Porte for the allowances usually enjoyed by the head of the house of Bin Rashid & had received no satisfactory repl. . For this reason , he was sending presents to Sheikh Mobarak & wished him to assist him in obtaining the desired protection .

3. On both occasions , Sheikh Mobarak was informed that you would forward to Government the communication made to you and that the orders of Government must be awaited .

I have the honour to be , Sir ,
Your most obedient servant,

Major,
Political Agent, Koweit.





Confidential No: 223 of 1907

From Major S.G.KNOX , I.A.

Political Agent , Koweit.

To Major P.Z.COX , I.A.,C.I.E.

Resident & H.B.M.'s Consul-General in the
Persian Gulf , Bushire .

D/ Koweit 13/5/7.

Sir,


I have the honour to inform you that I visited Sheikh Mobarak this morning and found him very communicative & interesting on the subject of his interviews with the Turkish authorities at his recent visit to Rao .

2. He said that he had had some trouble with them about the assessment of his Rao revenues & that he had had to inform them they must reckon their revenues on the datetrees bearing fruit & not on the area of the gardens which had been ruined by the action of their own Wali , who interfered with the protecting embankment & let the sea in on to the date-gardens .

3. He said that the Commision went & inspected the date-gardens but that he refused to go himself , as he was afraid that evil-minded people would say that he had bribed them .

4. The Sheikh then went on to say that , during his visit , he had been approached by one Bartū pasha , Irkān Harab , who consulted with him as to the possibility of establishing friendl, relations between the Turkish Government & the Bedouin tribes , on a system of payment of their Sheikhs . He said that they were all in Sheikh Mobarak's hands & that he was sure that the Sheikh could assist him in effecting his object.

5. The Sheikh says that the Turkish officer had a book with him in which the names of all the tribes were ~~were~~ written down & he asked the Sheikh about each one & the Sheikh replied putting objections in his way .






158
227

The Umtair were with Bin Sa'ūd, so were the Sbi'a & Sahul . The Ajman, Bani Khalid &c &c were the tribes of El Ahse , their own province . The Thaffir were round Basra & Zubair , the officer should consult Khalid^{ul} Aon . The 'Ataiba were under the Sharif of Mecca . The Harb? Why ! Bless your soul ! to get at the Harb , you should apply round Medina . As regards the Sheikh's own Bedouins , true that he kept a few unimportant sections to look after his horses & camels . They were called the 'Araibdar , i.e. the Arabs of the dar. He lived in a dar , a house . Their Sheikhs with their riding camels were all at the gentleman's service, if he wished to enter into relations with the Bedouin Sheikhs . The Turk seems to have got home here with the reply " But I hear that you have the head Sheikh of the Ajman under lock and key & that you collect ~~xi~~ zikat from all these people . " "Not exactly that . He was misguided enough to carry off about 500 camels and only offered to bring back 170 . So he had to stay as a hostage , until the others were restored . But it is all done by kindness and good faith . No compulsion . With regard to Bin Sa'ūd and Bin Rashid , the position is not quite the same . They are mighty chiefs, far more important than I am . I strive to keep on excellent terms with them but I have no influence with them . You should approach them direct." The Turkish officer listened to all this , gravely shaking his head, and then remarked that he was going up to the Muntafik at present & would then go round by sea to El Ahse .

6. At this point , I mentioned to the Sheikh that I had noticed recently that quite a number of Bedouin Sheikhs had been coming to me and that with a view to getting on good terms with them , I had , as he was probably well aware , been making them small presents of cash and clothes and I asked the Sheikh what he thought of these measures . That , if he thought that this was likely to rouse the suspicion of the Turks &






159
228
so induce them to extend their influence over the tribes & sap his authority, I wanted no more aid or prestige in the desert than what he could afford & would discourage them.

7. The Sheikh replied that he was perfectly aware of what I was doing and that he himself was encouraging the Sheikh to go to me & that no possible harm could come of my getting on friendly terms with them & asking them questions about their history, pedigree & customs. As regards the Turks, they would never do anything with the tribes. Even if they succeeded in inducing the Sheikh to come in & gave them allowances for a few months, they would at once begin to exact onerous services in return & nothing but trouble would follow. When the Turks had succeeded in collecting the "miri" due to them from the Muntifich (I think he named T3 160,000), who were actually in their territory, it would be time enough for them to take the true desert tribes in hand & settle them.

8. I told the Sheikh that for some days I had had it in my mind to consult him about visiting the Sabha & Jiblan tribes sections of the Umtair, which are camped round Subaiha. I had now made the acquaintance of their Sheikh & it would be interesting to go & see them in their tents. The Sheikh replied that I was perfectly welcome to do this.

9. He then turned to me abruptly & said "I notice that the Government do not seem in a hurry to extend their protection to Bin Sa'ud. It would be a very good thing if they did." I asked him "What good would it do? Do you want the Turks to send soldiers again to Nejd & do you want British soldiers to march into Nejd to oppose them?" He laughed at this and said "No! No! the terror of your name would suffice. They are very much afraid of you. Why did they honour Bin Sa'ad's messengers so much? Only because they are afraid of you. It would be so good for trade & general quiet."





It is impossible for me , living in a town , of which
the atmosphere reeks with intrigue , to refrain from
speculating as to what the old Sheikh's object was in
throwing this question at me & I must ask pardon , if
these speculations appear to those , happily free from
such influences , to be childish & farfetched.


10. All the later indications point to the notion that
Sheikh Mobarak thinks that the family of Bin Rashid
have been sufficiently humbled & that Bin Sa'ūd is
getting above himself. I think that the projects of
the Turkish officer alarmed him seriously . The
influence over the tribes is a privilege that all ~~of~~
these ~~tribes~~ Sheikhs , whether Us-Subah , Bin Sa'ūd
or Bin Rashid watch most jealously . The terror of
our name , in Sheikh Mobarak's mouth , is mere flattery
and ~~the~~ the only use of flattery is to help a man make
a fool of himself.


Does he want us to lend our name to Bin Sa'ūd ,
so as to bring the Turkish troops down to embarrass
him , and set Sultan bin Hamūd ur Rashid on his feet,
so that the two combatants may exhaust each other over
again ?


Or , does he think that the English , in their
insane philanthropy & vain-gloriousness , may set
themselves up as arbiters of the destinies of Central
Arabia , destroy the Turkish bug-bear for ever , &
establish garrisons in El-Casim , in which case he is
confident in his own skill & ability to ride them ,
as he would one of his own horses ?


Or , lastly , the Sheikh knows that Government
moves slowly . Is he afraid that , when the situation
has completely changed , an order may come affording
Bin Sa'ūd protection , which may not suit Mobarak at
all & is he merely fishing for information ?


11. I have the honour to express my regret that I
must leave the riddle , to which I have no answer in
this unsatisfactory condition with the one remark



















164 (163)

234

Confidential

No: 256 of 1907.

From Major S.G. Knox, I.A.

Political Agent, Koweit.

To Major P.Z. Cox, C.I.E., I.A.,

Resident & H.B.M.'s Consul-

General in the Persian Gulf

Bushire

D/ Koweit 1/6/7

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your office memorandum No: 1115 dated 28th May 1907, with which was forwarded a copy of letter No: 345 dated 13th May 1907 from the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia to your address.


2. I took the letter to Sheikh Mobarak this afternoon and informed him of the reports that were current in Bagdad.

He informed me that, like myself, he had heard nothing of any important engagement in Nejd between the factions of Bin Sa'ud & Bin Rashid and that his messengers from the interior had arrived only yesterday, after visiting both the Chiefs, Bin Rashid at Hail & Bin Sa'ud at Shagra in the district of Washam, whither he had gone after the fight with the Umtair at Majma'a in Sadair.

3. He said that Bin Rashid was too weak to risk an engagement with Bin Sa'ud and, as regards the latter, he said that Boraida and Anaiza were hostile to him and that he could not risk much, as he had the Nejd townsmen against him on account of his incessant demands for men & money.

4. I asked the Sheikh what was the cause of Bin Sa'ud's sudden and apparently unprovoked attack on the 'Alwa Umtair and he said that Bin Sa'ud was too hasty in all his dealings, that he was too quick to anger & too easily appeased.

5. With reference to the report about the T3500, the Sheikh informed that he had paid no special contribution towards the building of a fort in Basra and that the





(١٦٤) 165
235

Fact fo his having recently paid two sums of T2500 as the
revenue on his Fao lands must have been so interpreted.



I have the honour to be , Sir,

Your most obedient servant ,

A. Ruos

Major ,

Political Agent , Koweit





166 (165)
236

No. 1321 of 1907.

CONFIDENTIAL

British Residency and -Consulate-General,

Bushire, 22nd June 1907.

To

The Political Agent,
K O W E I T.

Sir,

With reference to paragraph 9 of your letter No. 223 dated 13th May 1907, and previous correspondence regarding Shaikh Mubarak's several overtures in connection with Abdurrahman bin Saood's desire for British protection, I have the honour to inform you that the situation in Nejd and our policy in regard thereto has again been deliberately considered by His Majesty's Government and that they have decided to adhere to their previous decision that British interests and influence must be strictly confined to the Coast.

Under these circumstances I have the honour to request that you will take an early opportunity of informing Shaikh Mubarak from me that the overtures received through him from Bin Saood involve considerations which it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to entertain.


You may give him the same reply with reference to his recent reference of a similar kind on behalf of Sultan "Bin Rashid", vide your letter No. 169 dated 15th April 1907.

I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

P. 2. Cox Major,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf





Confidential No: 324 of 1907

From Major S.G. Knox, I.A.

Political Agent, Koweit.

To J.H.H. Bill, Esquire, C.S.

First Assistant to the Resident & H.B.M.'s Consul-General in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

(in charge current duties)

D/ Koweit 15/7/7.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential letter no: 1321 dated 22nd June on the subject of the application for British protection by Abd ur Rahman bin Sa'ud & Sultan bin Rashid.


2. As instructed in paragraph 2 of the letter quoted above, I took the opportunity of an interview with Sheikh Moharak this morning to acquaint him with the decision of Government in this question. The Sheikh remarked that he had anticipated no other result, but that he was bound to pass the requests on. To this I assented.


I have the honour to be,


Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

Major,
Political Agent, Koweit









239

dragoman reports that Sultan el Hamud has captured Boreya, and captures it and sent for the Hamud tribes & sits in Gassim.


The same person is meant - which is he. dead? or victorious? Have you any later information







My dear Crow,
Thanks for your letter re my diaries. It was stupid of me not to have contradicted those lying reports of Sultan's death, which none ever seriously believed, but I made the not unusual mistake of thinking that what everybody knew in Koweit was known outside as well. I will have the truth put in in my next diary & am much obliged to you for drawing my attention to my neglect. I am not sure about Hermin.




I don't think Sultan ^{Y^v}
has conquered Boraida
but there is no doubt
that he is very much
alive & I am told we
may confidently expect
further developments soon.
He is on good terms with
the people of Boraida who
are certainly intriguing with
him. They tell Bin Saud
that they will pay him
tribute & that & all.

On the other hand, Anaza
& on Bin Saud's side.

I heard a good deal about
Sultan from his messenger
who came to see me
the other day & is awaiting
Mubarak's return

Be private





244

Please prepare & put up
for signature an encl.
Returned with thanks as
directed. Papers are with

me

27/8/7

[Signature]

No. 471 of 1907.

D 28/8/7


Enclosures Returned.

[Signature]

P.A.




"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٧١و] (٣٨٦/٣٤١)





"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٧١ظ] (٣٨٦/٣٤٢)





[Confidential.]

No. 2001, dated Bushire, the 15th (received 23rd) September 1907.

From—J. H. BILL, Esq., I.C.S., First Assistant Resident, in charge current duties,

To—SIR LOUIS W. DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of the marginally noted letter received to-day from the Political Agent, Koweit, on the subject of Nejd affairs, a précis of which will in view of the urgency of the matter and in accordance with a request from the Political Agent be communicated by telegraph.

No. 481, dated Koweit, the 3rd September 1907.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to report an interesting development of the Nejd situation, reported on in some fulness in this office diary No. 35 for the week ending 28th August 1907.

2. It would appear that Bin Sa'ud has written to Sheikh Mobarak in some form or other asking for his assistance at the present juncture, as he is seriously alarmed at the rapid advance in strength of Bin Rashid and the defection of Boraïda and the Umtair tribe. This is merely local conjecture to account for the action Sheikh Mobarak is taking, but it is probably founded on fact.

3. Fortunately, I decided to visit Sheikh Mobarak this morning and he opened the conversation by remarking that Nejd affairs were causing him a good deal of anxiety and that he was sure that the present movement would lead to the disastrous result of an occupation of El Kasim by the Turkish troops, as Sultan bin Rasid and the people of Boraïda were in no way far-seeing. The people of Boraïda wanted nothing but peace and Sultan bin Rashid was anxious to obtain recognition by the Turkish authorities and to secure himself against Bin Sa'ud's depredations. They would probably therefore call in the Turk, not perceiving that he, in the end, would be a harder master than Bin Sa'ud.

4. Accordingly Sheikh Mobarak has arranged to despatch Abdul Aziz ul Hassan, a native of a hamlet, Turaif, near Boraïda, to bring the Umtair back again and to persuade all parties to keep quiet.

5. Abdul Aziz ul Hassan has been frequently alluded to in my reports. He is Sheikh Mobarak's chief zikât collector and was the Amir ul Haj of the last Koweit pilgrim caravan. He is respected and of some influence, but I do not altogether share Sheikh Mobarak's optimism which persuades the latter that he will be successful in the difficult negotiations which he has to pursue.

6. He is, as I have said before, to persuade all parties to keep the peace; to order the Bedouins back again; to guarantee, on the part of Sheikh Mobarak, Bin Sa'ud in the possession of his territory, and Boraïda; say El Kasim against the aggression of both parties, and Sultan bin Rashid in the possession of Hail, and to state that Sheikh Mobarak will visit with his displeasure anybody who presumes to stir beyond the limit he has marked out for them.

7. It is a fine ambitious project worthy of the genius of the man who conceived it and, if there is any one, who can enforce it, he may fairly be regarded as the Nejd "*deus exmachina*" who would restore peace to that distressful country.

8. Boraïda will be ready enough to come to terms, but Sultan has already declared that he counts not on their assistance but their neutrality.



247

2

There remains the Umtair for it is not likely that the remainder of Sultan's following will pay much attention to Sheikh Mobarak's wishes.

Faisal ud Dawish has sent a written challenge to Bin Sa'ud and declares that, so long as 10 horsemen will follow him, he will fight Bin Sa'ud.


Too much attention need not be paid to Bedouin boasting, but a man who has had a bullet through his shoulder, which is barely healed, is apt to feel a bit sore about it, and the attack on the Umtair at Majma'a was hardly justifiable. Practically, the success of Mobarak's mission depends on this man's attitude.

9. Everybody in Koweit knows all about this mission, which fact in itself is significant. I had not been away from Mobarak two hours before I was informed of the facts from two different sources. People are not wanting who say that Mobarak is afraid of Bin Rashid's success and does not wish for a repetition of the situation of 1901.

10. I felt myself unable to make any reply to Sheikh Mobarak beyond that the situation as described by him would be reported to my Government and to remind him of their caution that they did not approve of his interference in Central Arabian politics. I could not say how far the despatch of Abdul Aziz ul Hassan, a native of El Kasim, to El Kasim would be regarded by them as an interference of the nature they deprecated.




"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٧٣و] (٣٨٦/٣٤٥)





"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٧٣ظ] (٣٨٦/٣٤٦)





176 874

249

Telegram.

FROM , Foreign , Simla .


No: S 443 , dated 25-9-07 . (recd 26-9-07)

(P). Please refer to your telegrams on the subject of Nejd affairs dated the 17th and 18th of September.

Pending conclusion of negotiations regarding foreshore it is most important to induce the Sheikh if possible to postpone consideration of the policy proposed by him with regard to Bin Rashid and Bin Saud.

If Sheikh Mubarak presses the matter Major Knox should inform him that the question is a very important one which must be referred to the Govt: of India and that in the meantime he can only refer the Sheikh to the warning given previously against interference in the affairs of Nejd. With regard to the proposal made by the Sheikh to guarantee the independence of El Kasim , he should be reminded by Major Knox that their claim to that district has not yet been abandoned by the Turks.

(Foreign).





Confidential No: 527 of 1907.

From Major S.G.Knox , I.A.,
Political Agent , Koweit .

To Major P.Z.Cox , I.A., C.I.E.,
Resident & H.B.M.'s Consul-General in the
Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Dated Koweit 29/9/07.

Sir ,

I have the honour to forward the following report
from Nejd .


Abdul Aziz ul Hussan recently sent a messenger ,
a man of no special importance & not one of Sheikh
Mobarak's servants , with letters for the Sheikh .
This man was travelling with a party of Towāta
Aniza Bedouins , about twenty-five strong.

At Ath Thamāmi ^{الثامي} they were set upon by
Ajman tribesmen who robbed them of arms , camels &
everything they possessed & they came through to
Koweit on foot & in a destitute condition . The طواطه
Towāta are the Aniza sub-section who hang about in
Koweit territory . Ath Thamāmi is a group of wells in
the Bātin , two days beyond Hafar & just inside the
Dahna sandbelt.

The leader of the Ajman raiders was one Muhammad ud
Dāmīr , one of the Sheikhs of the Tha'an ^{ضعي} section x
of the Ajman .

It is by no means certain that the outrage at Ath
Thamāma had any political significance or that it was
specially directed to get possession of Sheikh Mob-
arak's post-bag . It seems more likely that it was an
ordinary incident of desert travel.

The news brought verbally by the messenger is to
the effect that no one on the side of Bin Rashid has
paid the smallest attention to Abdul Aziz ul Hassan's
well meant efforts in the cause of peace . Indeed ,
Faisul ud Dawish , Sheikh of the Umtair , flatly
refused to obey his instructions .





(١٦) ١٧٨
٢٥١

Haza'a bin Ishgair & Badar bin Muhammad ud Dawish
are at Aj Ja'ala ^{الجبلة} wells in the tract of Al
ASYAH ^{الاسياح} about 8 hours from Boraidda for a riding
camel & a day & a half for a caravan . The report that
they were inclining towards Bin Saud & that the Umtair
were divided against themselves is now completely
discredited .

The result of Abdul Aziz ul Hassan's overtures to
Bin Sa'ud is unknown . One recent report places the
latter at Shagra ~~xx~~ & says that he has no Bedouins
with him but his sympathisers state that he has advan-
ced some distance towards El-Kasim & is in strength.


It may be noted that this last batch of Ajman raid-
ers have nothing to do with the party who , as report-
ed in recent diaries of this Agency , recently looted
a caravan destined for Koweit . The leaders of that
party were Idmayas Al Manaikhar ^{إحميس المنيفر}
Sheikh of the section of the As Safran, & Raikan of the
Bani Hithlain family. The negotiations for the reco-
very of that looted property appear to be also delayed


It would seem that the hinterland is in a very
disturbed state & that Sheikh Mobarak's authority is
not respected to the same extent as formerly , though ,
no doubt , this has no special significance & is
merely a part of the general unrest consequent on the
two leaders of Central Arabia preparing again for ~~xxx~~
battle .

I have the honour to be ,

Sir,


Your most obedient servant ,


 Major,
Political Agent , Koweit.







"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٧٧و] (٣٨٦/٣٥٣)









"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٧٧ظ] (٣٨٦/٣٥٤)







P.A. Harek



(Confidential)

No. 2195, dated Bushire, the 12th (received 22nd) October 1907.

From—J. H. H. BILL, Esq., I.C.S., First Assistant Resident, In charge current duties,

To—SIR LOUIS DARNLEY, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

In continuation of this office letter No. 2001, dated 15th September 1907, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the communication marginally noted received from the Political Agent, Kuwait, on the subject of Nejd Affairs.

No. 527, dated Kuwait, the 29th September 1907.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, I.A., C.I.E., Resident and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to forward the following report from Nejd:—

Abdul Aziz ul Hussan recently sent a messenger, a man of no special importance and not one of Sheikh Mobarak's servants, with letters for the Sheikh. This man was travelling with a party of Towāta Aniza Bedouins, about twenty-five strong.

At Ath Thamāmi they were set upon by Ajman tribesmen who robbed them of arms, camels and everything they possessed and they came through to Kuwait on foot and in a destitute condition. The Towāta are the Aniza subsection who hang about in Kuwait territory. Ath Thamāmi is a group of wells in the Bātin, two days beyond Hafar and just inside the Dahna sandbelt.

The leader of the Ajman raiders was one Muhammad ud Dāmīr, one of the Sheikhs of the Tha'an section of the Ajman.

It is by no means certain that the outrage at Ath Thamāmi had any political significance or that it was specially directed to get possession of Sheikh Mobarak's post-bag. It seems more likely that it was an ordinary incident of desert travel.

The news brought verbally by the messenger is to the effect that no one on the side of Bin Rashid has paid the smallest attention to Abdul Aziz ul Hassan's well meant efforts in the cause of peace. Indeed, Faisal ud Dawish, Sheikh of the Umtair, flatly refused to obey his instructions.



Haza'a bin Ishgair and Badar bin Muhammad-ud-Dawish are at Aj Ja'ala wells in the tract of Al Asyāh about 8 hours from Boraida for a riding camel and a day and a half for a caravan. The report that they were inclining towards Bin Saud and that the Umtair were divided against themselves is now completely discredited.


The result of Abdul Aziz ul Hussan's overtures to Bin Sa'ud is unknown. One recent report places the latter at Shagra and says that he has no Bedouins with him, but his sympathisers state that he has advanced some distance towards El-Kasim and is in strength.

It may be noted that this last batch of Ajman raiders have nothing to do with the party who, as reported in recent diaries of this Agency, recently looted a caravan destined for Kuwait. The leaders of that party were Ikhamayas Al Manaikhar Sheikh of the section of the As Safrān, and Raikān of the Bani Hithlain family. The negotiations for the recovery of that looted property appear to be also delayed.

It would seem that the hinterland is in a very disturbed state and that Sheikh Mobarak's authority is not respected to the same extent as formerly, though, no doubt, this has no special significance and is merely a part of the general unrest consequent on the two leaders of Central Arabia preparing again for battle.

G. C. B. P., Simla.—No. C.-516 F. D.—30-10-07.—14—J. D.






D/O. to P.R. 182
13/12/7. 2551 (80)

18.5
1.67
12.95
11.10
18.5
30.895


My dear Major,

It will no doubt be interesting to you to hear that, at my interview of yesterday with Sheikh Noorak, he told me that Sh. Laid of Abu Thali had sent him presents (this was duly reported in my diary) & that he wished to enter into communications with Bin Said. Noorak said that he replied that Laid had better turn his thoughts away from Bin Said & appeal instead to the British Government, that Bin



Sa'ud was in ^{Mubarak's} his hands ²⁵
& could do nothing for
Zaid of Abu Thali who
was fortunate in
~~possessing~~ ^{enjoying} the protection
of a beneficent Govt
&c.

He also mentioned
that he had received
letters from the Sheikh
of Dubai complaining
of the establishment
of the D. I. Agent
there who actually
insisted on flying a
flag. He wanted
Mubarak's help to
get rid of steamers
generally. Mubarak
represented himself
as writing another
fatherly letter to him
B.




pointing out the ¹⁹³257
manifest advantages ⁽¹⁸¹⁾
of mails & steamers.

Bin Rashid has
been sending messengers
to Sheikh Moabarake &
the latter says that the
Hail man's message
is to the effect that both
the Umair & the
people of Baniida have
deserted him and that
he is in Moabarake's
hands. Moabarake says
that he replied saying
that he had given advice
which was not taken &
did not intend to
interfere in Hail politics
again. I did not smile!



Yours sincerely



J. A. S. P.



P.S. I don't suppose the
Baniida people have really
split brasses with Bin
Rashid. The message





Seems to me fabricated
to please Inobarake + ²³
is the result of his
peremptory message to
make peace with Bin
Sa'ud.































Somewhat treacherously
by detaching the ²⁶⁵Uman
tribe from Bin Rashid
& generally lulling that
party's suspicion by
false assurances of
benevolent intervention.
While at the same
time he informed Bin
Saud that it was a good
opportunity to attack
his enemies.

3. My personal
opinion is that Sheikh
Muhammad was behind
the scenes the whole
time, that he encouraged
the Bin Rashid faction
to make head against
Bin Saud with a view
to showing the latter
chieftain that he was
not strong enough to



stand alone & was ¹⁹¹266
still in need of Inobarak's
assistance & that, when
he saw matters had
gone far enough & that
Bin Saud had learnt
his lesson, he shamelessly
deceived the other party
Bin Rashid & his friends
engineered the separation
& deceived them to
Bin Saud.

4. I have little
hesitation in expressing
the opinion that Sheikh
Inobarak will continue
to interfere in ^{as far as} he'd
politics but at the same
time I do not think
that there is the slightest
reason to fear a repetition
of ~~the~~ an expedition from
Koweit after the Larif
disaster & it would be
a mistake to treat too



seriously his pretensions ²⁶⁷
to act as keeper of the
peace between Bin
Rashid & Bin Saud
& to secure for the
observance of the conditions
published with each
of the hollow truces
hatched up between
them every few months.


5. The present news
from Hejd is very scanty
& I have heard nothing
that would lead me
to anticipate at present
any further disturbance
of the peace.

I have &c

R




"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٨٩] (٣٨٦/٣٧٧)







"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٨٩ظ] (٣٨٦/٣٧٨)







Constantinople.













"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [١٩٢ظ] (٣٨٤/٣٨٦)





"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [خلفي-داخلي] (٣٨٥/٣٨٦)





"ملف ١/X ابن سعود وابن رشيد" [خلفي] (٣٨٦/٣٨٦)

